Clear Site Data

1. Introduction

This section is not normative.

Web applications store data locally on a user’s computer in order to provide functionality while the user is offline, and to increase performance when the user is online. These local caches have significant advantages for both users and developers, but present risks as well.

A user’s data is both sensitive and valuable; web developers ought to take reasonable steps to protect it. One such step would be to encrypt data before storing it. Another would be to remove data from the user’s machine when it is no longer necessary (for example, when the user signs out of the application, or deletes their account).

Site authors can remove data from a number of storage mechanisms via JavaScript, but others are difficult to deal with reliably. Consider cookies, for instance, which can be partially cleared via JavaScript access to document.cookie. HttpOnly cookies, however, can only be removed via a number of Set-Cookie headers in an HTTP response. This, of course, requires exhaustive knowledge of all the cookies set for a host, which can be complicated to ascertain. Cache is still harder; no imperative interface to a browser’s network cache exists, period.

This document defines a new mechanism to deal with removing data from these and other types of local storage, giving web developers the ability to clear out a user’s local cache of data via the Clear-Site-Data HTTP response header.

1.1. Examples

1.1.1. Signing Out

A user signs out of Super Secret Social Network via a CSRF-protected POST to


https://supersecretsocialnetwork.example.com/logout

, and the site author wishes to ensure that locally stored data is removed as a result.

They can do so by sending the following HTTP header in the response:

Clear-Site-Data: "cache", "cookies", "storage", "executionContexts"

1.1.2. Targeted Clearing

A user signs out of Megacorp Inc.'s site via a CSRF-protected POST to


https://megacorp.example.com/logout

. Megacorp has a large number of services available as subdomains, so many that it’s not entirely clear which of them would be safe to clear as a response to a logout action. One option would be to simply clear everything, and deal with the fallout. Megacorp’s CEO, however, once lost hours and hours of progress in "Irate Ibexes" due to inadvertent site-data clearing, and so refuses to allow such a sweeping impact to the site’s users.

The developers know, however, that the "Minus" application is certainly safe to clear out. They can target this specific subdomain by including a request to that subdomain as part of the logout landing page (ideally as a CORS-enabled, CSRF-protected POST):

fetch("https://minus.megacorp.example.com/clear-site-data",
      {
          method: "POST",
          mode: "cors",
          headers: new Headers({
              "CSRF": "[insert sekrit token here]"
          })
      });

That endpoint would return proper CORS headers in response to that request’s preflight, and would return the following header for the actual request:

Clear-Site-Data: "cache", "cookies", "storage", "executionContexts"

1.1.3. Keep Critical Cookies

A user opts-out of interest-based advertising via a CSRF-protected POST to


https://ads-are-awesome.example.com/optout

. The site author wishes to remove DOM-accessible data which might contain tracking information, but needs to ensure that the opt-out cookie which the user has just received isn’t wiped along with it.

They can do so by sending the following HTTP header in the response, which includes all the types except for " cookies ":

Clear-Site-Data: "cache", "storage", "executionContexts"

1.1.4. Kill Switch

Super Secret Social Network’s developers learn that the site was vulnerable to cross-site scripting attacks which allowed malicious parties to inject arbitrary code into its origin. They fixed the site, and added a strong Content Security Policy [CSP] to mitigate the risk going forward, but they can’t be entirely sure that clients are really back to a trustworthy state. Perhaps the attackers found a clever persistence mechanism?

They can reduce the risk of a persistent client-side XSS by sending the following HTTP header in a response to wipe out local sources of data:

Clear-Site-Data: "cache", "cookies", "storage", "executionContexts"

Note: Installing a Service Worker guarantees that a request will go out to a server every ~24 hours. That update ping would be a wonderful time to send a header like this one in case of catastrophe. [SERVICE-WORKERS]

1.2. Goals

Generally, the goal is to allow web developers more control over the data stored locally by a user agent for their origins. In particular, developers should be able to reliably ensure the following:

Data stored in an origin’s client-side storage mechanisms like [INDEXEDDB] , WebSQL, Filesystem, localStorage, and sessionStorage is cleared.
Cookies for an origin’s host are removed [RFC6265] .
Web Workers (dedicated and shared) running for an origin are terminated.
Service Workers registered for an origin are terminated and deregistered.
Resources from an origin are removed from the user agent’s local cache.
The Accept-CH cache for an origin is purged.
None of the above can be bypassed by a maliciously active document that retains interesting data in memory, and rewrites it if it’s cleared.

2. Infrastructure

This document uses ABNF grammar to specify syntax, as defined in [RFC5234] and updated in [RFC7405] , along with the #rule extension defined in Section 7 of [RFC7230] , and the quoted-string rule defined in Section 3.2.6 of the same document.

This document depends on the Infra Standard for a number of foundational concepts used in its algorithms and prose [INFRA] .

3. Clearing Site Data

Developers may instruct a user agent to clear various types of relevant data by delivering a Clear-Site-Data HTTP response header in response to a request.

The Clear-Site-Data HTTP response header field sends a signal to the user agent that it ought to remove all data of a certain set of types. The header is represented by the following grammar:

Clear-Site-Data = 1#( quoted-string )
; #rule is defined in Section 7 of RFC 7230.

§ 3.2 Fetch Integration and § 4.1 Parsing describe how the Clear-Site-Data header is processed.

This document defines an initial set of known data types which can be cleared using this mechanism. See their descriptions below. Future versions of the header can support additional datatypes, which MUST comply with the quoted-string grammar. User agents MUST ignore unknown types when parsing the header.

" cache "

The " cache " type indicates that the server wishes to remove locally cached data associated with the origin of a particular response ’s url . This includes the network cache , of course, but will also remove data from various other caches which a user agent implements (prerendered pages, back/forward caches, script caches, shader caches, Accept-CH cache , etc.).

Implementation details are in § 4.2.3 Clear cache for origin .

When delivered with a response from


https://example.com/clear

, the following header will cause caches associated with the origin


https://example.com

: to be cleared:

Clear-Site-Data: "cache"

Note: Caches are typically not organized by origin, but rather by URL and timestamp. This means that in practice, clearing cache by origin might have to be implemented using a linear scan. For large caches, this makes it a prohibitively expensive operation.

" cookies "

The " cookies " type indicates that the server wishes to remove cookies associated with the origin of a particular response ’s url . Along with cookies, HTTP authentication credentials [RFC7235] , and origin-bound tokens such as those defined by Channel ID [CHANNELID] and Token Binding [TOKBIND] are also cleared.

Implementation details are in § 4.2.4 Clear cookies for origin .

When delivered with a response from


https://example.com/clear

, the following header will cause cookies associated with the origin


https://example.com

to be cleared, as well as cookies on any origin in the same registered domain (e.g.


https://www.example.com/

and


https://more.subdomains.example.com/

Clear-Site-Data: "cookies"

Note: Clearing cookies should also clear the Accept-CH cache for origin . This is because the cache is also cleared if the user manually clears cookies.

" storage "

The " storage " type indicates that the server wishes to remove locally stored data associated with the origin of a particular response ’s url . This includes storage mechanisms such as ( localStorage, sessionStorage, [INDEXEDDB] , [WEBDATABASE] , etc), as well as tangentially related mechanism such as service worker registrations .

Implementation details are in § 4.2.5 Clear DOM-accessible storage for origin .

When delivered with a response from


https://example.com/clear

, the following header will cause DOM-accessible storage for the origin


https://example.com

to be cleared:

Clear-Site-Data: "storage"

" executionContexts "

The " executionContexts " type indicates that the server wishes to neuter and reload execution contexts currently rendering the origin of a particular response ’s url .

When delivered with a response from


https://example.com/clear

, the following header will cause execution contexts displaying the origin


https://example.com

to be neutered and reloaded:

Clear-Site-Data: "executionContexts"

" clientHints "

The " clientHints " type indicates that the server wishes clear the Accept-CH cache for the origin of a particular response ’s url .

When delivered with a response from


https://example.com/clear

, the following header will cause the Accept-CH cache for origin


https://example.com

to be cleared:

Clear-Site-Data: "clientHints"

Note: The Accept-CH cache is also cleared for the cache and cookies options, so it should be used only when neither of the other options (or * ) are applied.

" * "

The " * " (wildcard) pseudotype indicates that the server has the same effect as specifying all types.

When delivered with a response from


https://example.com/clear

, the following header will cause all cookies, caches, and DOM-accessible storage associated with the origin


https://example.com

to be cleared, as well as execution contexts for the same origin to be neutered and reloaded:

Clear-Site-Data: "*"

Note: The wildcard is forward-compatible in the sense that if more datatypes are added in future versions of this header, they will also be covered by it.

DO use the wildcard if the intention is to perform a broad cleanup, i.e. clear all data associated with an origin that the header knows about.

DO NOT use the wildcard as a shorthand for the four types listed above, as this meaning might change.

Note: The syntax defined here is compatible with future extensions to this document which might add more granular filtering mechanisms to the types we’ve defined. For example, it’s likely that " cookies " will need to grow a mechanism to prevent deletion of specific cookie values. Wrapping all of the type names in double-quotes means that we can easily shift from simple splitting-strings-on-commas processing to something more complicated (like processing the header value as JSON) without losing backwards compatibility.

3.2. Fetch Integration

Monkey patching! Talk with Anne.

If the Clear-Site-Data header is present in an HTTP response received from the network, then data MUST be cleared before rendering the response to the user. That is, after step #14 in the current HTTP-network fetch algorithm, execute the following step:

If credentials flag is set, and response ’s header list contains a header named Clear-Site-Data , then execute § 4.2 Clear data for response on response.

Note: This happens after Set-Cookie headers are processed. If we clear cookies, we clear all of them. This is intentional, as removing only certain cookies might leave an application in an indeterminate and vulnerable state. Removing specific cookies is best done via expiration using the Set-Cookie header.

Note: If we clear the Accept-CH cache via the Clear-Site-Data header then any Accept-CH and Critical-CH headers in the same request must be ignored.

Note: While the fetch credentials flag is intended to restrict the modification of cookies, Clear-Site-Data applies the same restriction to all types for the sake of consistency.

4. Algorithms

4.1. Parsing

Given a response , the user agent can parse response ’s Clear-Site-Data header , returning a list of types, as follows:

Let types be an empty list.
Let header be the result of extracting header list values given Clear-Site-Data and response ’s header list .
If header is null or failure, return an empty list.
For each type in header, execute the first matching statement, if any, switching on type:

` "cache" `

Append " cache " and " clientHints " to types.

` "cookies" `

Append " cookies " and " clientHints " to types.

` "storage" `

Append " storage " to types.

` "executionContexts" `

Append " executionContexts " to types.

` "clientHints" `

Append " clientHints " to types.

` "*" `

Append " cache ", " cookies ", " storage ", " clientHints ", and " executionContexts " to types.
Return types.

Note: All of the existing values can be handled with the simple switch above. If and when more complex type definitions are created, the parser will likely shift over to JSON entirely.

4.2. Clear data for `response`

Given a response ( response ), the user agent can clear site data for response as follows:

If response ’s url is not an a priori authenticated URL , then break .
Let types be the result of parsing response ’s Clear-Site-Data header .
Let origin be response ’s url 's origin .
Let browsing contexts be the result of preparing to clear data for origin and types.
For each type in types:
1. Execute the first matching statement, if any, switching on type:
  
  " cache "
  
  Clear cache for origin .
  
  " cookies "
  
  Clear cookies for origin .
  
  " storage "
  
  Clear DOM-accessible storage for origin .
  
  " clientHints "
  
  Empty Accept-CH cache [ origin ].
If types contains " executionContexts ", then Reload browsing contexts .

Note: User agents are are encouraged to give web developers some mechanism by which the clearing operation can be debugged. This might take the form of a console message or timeline entry indicating success.

4.2.1. Prepare to clear `origin` ’s data

Given an origin ( origin ) and a list of types ( types ), the user agent can prepare to clear origin ’s data by executing the following steps. The algorithm returns a list of browsing contexts which have been sandboxed in order to prevent them from recreating cleared data from in-memory JavaScript variables.

Let sandboxed be an empty list.
If types does not contain " executionContexts ", return sandboxed.
For each context in the user agent’s set of browsing contexts :
1. Let document be context ’s active document .
2. If document ’s relevant settings object 's origin is not origin, continue .
3. Parse a sandboxing directive using the empty string as the input, and document ’s active sandboxing flag set as the output.
4. Append context to sandboxed.
Return sandboxed.

4.2.2. Reload `browsing contexts`

Given a list of browsing contexts ( contexts ), the user agent can reload browsing contexts as follows:

For each context in contexts:
1. Execute context ’s active document 's relevant settings object 's global object 's Location object’s reload().
  
  This is the simplest thing, but it’s probably reaching a little too far into the documents and mucking with their context. I probably just need to break down and copy/paste the relevant bits from HTML.

4.2.3. Clear cache for `origin`

Given an origin ( origin ), the user agent can clear cache for origin as follows:

Let host be origin ’s host .
Let cache list be the set of entries from the network cache whose target URI host is identical to host.
1. For each entry in cache list:
  1. Remove entry from the network cache .
2. If a user agent implements caches beyond a pure network cache , it MUST remove all entries from those caches which match origin.
For each traversable in the user agent’s set of top-level traversable :
1. For each entry in the traversable ’s session history entries :
  1. Let state be entry ’s document state .
  2. Let entry origin be state ’s origin .
  3. If entry origin is the same origin as origin:
    1. Let document be state ’s document .
    2. If document is not fully active :
      1. Destroy the document.
We’re dealing with the network cache here, as defined in [RFC7234] , but that’s not nearly everything a user agent caches. How hand-wavey with the vendor-specific section can we be? For instance, Chrome clears out prerendered pages, script caches, WebGL shader caches, WebRTC bits and pieces, address bar suggestion caches, various networking bits that aren’t representations (HSTS/HPKP, SCDH, etc.). Perhaps [STORAGE] will make this clearer?

4.2.4. Clear cookies for `origin`

Given an origin ( origin ), the user agent can clear cookies for origin as follows:

Note: We remove all the cookies for an entire registered domain , as cookies ignore the same-origin policy, and there’s a distinct risk that we’d leave applications in an ill-defined state if we only cleared cookies for a particular subdomain. Consider accounts.google.com vs mail.google.com, for instance, both of which have cookies that signal a user’s signed-in status.

Note: This algorithm assumes that the user agent has implemented a cookie store (as discussed in Section 5.3 of [RFC6265] ), which offers the ability to retrieve a list of cookies by host, and to remove individual cookies.

Let registered be the registered domain of origin ’s host .
Let cookie list be the set of cookies from the cookie store whose domain attribute is a domain-match with registered.
For each cookie in cookie list:
1. Remove cookie from the cookie store .
If the user agent supports other forms of cookie-like storage, these MUST also be cleared for origins whose host 's registered domain is registered.

Note: For example, if the user agent supports Flash, its local stored objects will be cleared via NPP_ClearSiteData .
Clear any Channel IDs [CHANNELID] and bound tokens [TOKBIND] associated with origins whose host 's registered domain is registered.
Clear authentication entries and proxy-authentication entries associated with origins whose host 's registered domain is registered.

The process of clearing both bound tokens/IDs and HTTP authentication is super hand-wavey. [Issue #w3c/webappsec-clear-site-data#2]

4.2.5. Clear DOM-accessible storage for `origin`

Given an origin ( origin ), the user agent can clear DOM-accessible storage for origin as follows:

For each area in the user agent’s set of local storage areas [HTML] :
1. If area ’s origin is origin:
  1. Execute clear() on the Storage object associated with area.
For each area in the user agent’s set of session storage areas [HTML] :
1. If area ’s origin is origin:
  1. Execute clear() on the Storage object associated with area.
For each database in the set of databases for origin [INDEXEDDB] :
1. Delete database.
For each registration in the user agent’s set of service worker registrations :
1. If registration ’s scope URL ’s origin is origin:
  1. Execute unregister() on registration.
For each appcache in the user agent’s set of application caches :
1. If appcache ’s application cache group is identified by an URL whose origin is origin:
  1. Discard appcache.
For any other script-accessible storage mechanism, the user agent MUST delete any data associated with this origin. This includes (but is not limited to) the following:
1. An origin’s WebSQL databases [WEBDATABASE] .
2. An origin’s filesystems [file-system-api]
3. Plugin data (e.g. Flash via NPP_ClearSiteData ),
4. Moar?

5. Security Considerations

5.1. Incomplete Clearing

It is possible that an application could be put into an indeterminate state by clearing only one type of storage. We mitigate that to some extent by clearing all storage options as a block, and by requiring that the header be delivered over a secure connection.

5.2. Service workers

It is imperative that the Clear-Site-Data header is only respected on responses fetched over network, and not those served by a service worker.

This is because service workers can return arbitrary responses for resource requests in their scope, including third-party requests. Thus, supporting Clear-Site-Data would give them the ability to clear data for any origin.

Note that if a request is sent to a service worker, not handled by it, then restarted with a service-workers mode of " none " and sent to the network, the corresponding response is a network response and can be handled. The previous attempt at obtaining the response from a service worker is irrelevant.

Note also that a service worker update is a network response, and is therefore not affected by this restriction. This is important in order to support the use case in § 1.1.4 Kill Switch .

6. Privacy Considerations

6.1. Web developers control the timing.

If triggered at appropriate times, Clear-Site-Data can increase a user’s privacy and security by clearing sensitive data from their user agent. However, note that the web developer (and not the user) is in control of when the clearing event is triggered. Even assuming a non-malicious site author, users can’t rely on data being cleared at any particular point, nor are users in control of what data types are cleared.

If a user wishes to ensure that site data is indeed cleared at some specific point, they ought to rely on the data-clearing functionality offered by their user agent.

At a bare minimum, user agents OUGHT TO (in the [RFC6919] sense of the words) offer the same functionality to users that they offer to web developers. Ideally, they will offer significantly more than we can offer at a platform level (clearing browsing history, for example).

6.2. Remnants of data on disk.

While Clear-Site-Data triggers a clearing event in a user’s agent, it is difficult to make promises about the state of a user’s disk after a clearing event takes place. In particular, note that it is up to the user agent to ensure that all traces of a site’s date is actually removed from disk, which can be a herculean task (consider virtual memory, as a good example of a larger issue).

In short, most user agents implement data clearing as "best effort", but can’t promise an exhaustive wipe.

If a user wishes to ensure that site data does not remain on disk, the best way to do so is to use a browsing mode that promises not to intentionally write data to disk (Chrome’s "Incognito", Internet Explorer’s "InPrivate", etc). These modes will do a better job of keeping data off disk, but are still subject to a number of limitations at the edges.

7. IANA Considerations

The permanent message header field registry should be updated with the following registration: [RFC3864]

7.1. Clear-Site-Data

Header field name: Clear-Site-Data
Applicable protocol: http
Status: standard
Author/Change controller: W3C
Specification document: This specification (See § 3.1 The Clear-Site-Data HTTP Response Header Field )

8. Acknowledgements

Michal Zalewski proposed a variant of this concept, and Mark Knichel helped refine the details.

Clear Site Data

Abstract

Status of this document

1. Introduction

1.1. Examples

1.1.1. Signing Out

1.1.2. Targeted Clearing

1.1.3. Keep Critical Cookies

1.1.4. Kill Switch

1.2. Goals

2. Infrastructure

3. Clearing Site Data

3.1. The `Clear-Site-Data` HTTP Response Header Field

3.2. Fetch Integration

4. Algorithms

4.1. Parsing

4.2. Clear data for `response`

4.2.1. Prepare to clear `origin` ’s data

4.2.2. Reload `browsing contexts`

4.2.3. Clear cache for `origin`

4.2.4. Clear cookies for `origin`

4.2.5. Clear DOM-accessible storage for `origin`

5. Security Considerations

5.1. Incomplete Clearing

5.2. Service workers

6. Privacy Considerations

6.1. Web developers control the timing.

6.2. Remnants of data on disk.

7. IANA Considerations

7.1. Clear-Site-Data

8. Acknowledgements

Index

Terms defined by this specification

Terms defined by reference

References

Normative References

Informative References

Issues Index

Clear Site Data

Abstract

Status of this document

1. Introduction

1.1. Examples

1.1.1. Signing Out

1.1.2. Targeted Clearing

1.1.3. Keep Critical Cookies

1.1.4. Kill Switch

1.2. Goals

2. Infrastructure

3. Clearing Site Data

3.1. The Clear-Site-Data HTTP Response Header Field

3.2. Fetch Integration

4. Algorithms

4.1. Parsing

4.2. Clear data for response

4.2.1. Prepare to clear origin ’s data

4.2.2. Reload browsing contexts

4.2.3. Clear cache for origin

4.2.4. Clear cookies for origin

4.2.5. Clear DOM-accessible storage for origin

5. Security Considerations

5.1. Incomplete Clearing

5.2. Service workers

6. Privacy Considerations

6.1. Web developers control the timing.

6.2. Remnants of data on disk.

7. IANA Considerations

7.1. Clear-Site-Data

8. Acknowledgements

Index

Terms defined by this specification

Terms defined by reference

References

Normative References

Informative References

Issues Index

3.1. The `Clear-Site-Data` HTTP Response Header Field

4.2. Clear data for `response`

4.2.1. Prepare to clear `origin` ’s data

4.2.2. Reload `browsing contexts`

4.2.3. Clear cache for `origin`

4.2.4. Clear cookies for `origin`

4.2.5. Clear DOM-accessible storage for `origin`