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The Linked Web Storage Protocol specification aims to provide applications with secure and permissioned access to externally stored data in an interoperable way.
The Linked Web Storage Protocol does/does not include protocol details for integration with identity layers and mechanisms; access management and data integrity; notifications about resource changes; and authorization mechanisms.
This section describes the status of this document at the time of its publication. A list of current W3C publications and the latest revision of this technical report can be found in the W3C standards and drafts index .
This is an unofficial proposal.
This document was published by the Linked Web Storage Working Group as an Editor's Draft.
Publication as an Editor's Draft does not imply endorsement by W3C and its Members.
This is a draft document and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to cite this document as other than a work in progress.
This document was produced by a group operating under the W3C Patent Policy . W3C maintains a public list of any patent disclosures made in connection with the deliverables of the group; that page also includes instructions for disclosing a patent. An individual who has actual knowledge of a patent that the individual believes contains Essential Claim(s) must disclose the information in accordance with section 6 of the W3C Patent Policy .
This document is governed by the 18 August 2025 W3C Process Document .
This section is non-normative.
List of TODO s and ideas in flux to enable editors to communicate asynchronously.
This section is non-normative.
The LWS Protocol defines standard interactions by which a some party can make some resources available to some agents.
A resource manager may keep a served resource private, may make it publicly available to anyone, or may limited its visibility to a constrained set of requesting agents .
As well as sections marked as non-normative, all authoring guidelines, diagrams, examples, and notes in this specification are non-normative. Everything else in this specification is normative.
The key words MAY , MUST , MUST NOT , RECOMMENDED , REQUIRED , and SHOULD in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [ RFC2119 ] [ RFC8174 ] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
A LWS REST Server is an HTTP server [ rfc9112 ] that complies with all of the relevant " MUST " statements in this specification. Specifically, the relevant normative " MUST " statements in Sections 999 REST Binding of this document MUST be respected.
A LWS REST Client is an HTTP client [ rfc9112 ] that complies with all of the relevant " MUST " statements in this specification. Specifically, the relevant normative " MUST " statements in Sections 999 REST Binding of this document MUST be respected.
The terms "authorization server" and "client" are defined by the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework [ RFC6749 ].
The terms "end-user" and "issuer" are defined by OpenID Connect Core 1.0 [ OPENID-CONNECT-CORE ].
This specificaiton defines the following terms:
This specification defines operations on served resources , the resulting change of state, and a response indended to give the requesting agent requested infomation or inform them of the outcome of the operation . An operation is any of the following actions that can be performed on a served resource :
The folowing section will describe the semantics and responses of these operations but the following core responses apply to any operation:
This section defines a mechanism for identifying agents and end users that interact with a linked web storage server. This specification does not mandate a particular format for end-user credentials, though it does describe how existing identity systems can be used in conjunction with the linked web storage authorization framework.
The data model described in this section outlines the requirements for any concrete serialization of an end-user credential.
An end-user credential MUST include tamper evident claims about a subject, including:
Validation of an end-user credential requires a trust relationship between the verifier and issuer of the credential. This trust relationship MAY be established through an out-of-band mechanism. Any additional mechanisms for establishing trust between a verifier and an issuer are outlined in specific authentication suites.
An end-user credential MUST be signed. It is RECOMMENDED that the signature uses asymmetric cryptography.
Each authentication suite MUST be associated with a token type URI. An authentication suite SHOULD use a URI defined in the IANA "OAuth URI" registry.
Define how requesting agents discover served resources and their capabilities.
In addition to the core responses , a create operation may produce any of:
The read resource operation requests a resource representation . Draw from Solid Protocol - Reading Resources .
The update resource modifies the contents of a served resource . Draw from Solid Protocol - Reading Resources .
Define the data model for logical resource organization within LWS, including how containers are structured, hierarchical relationships between resources, container semantics, containment rules, and the mechanisms for organizing and navigating collections of related resources. This should cover container creation, membership management, and the relationship between containers and the resources they contain.
This strawman mapping of the operations and responses defined above allows LWS REST Servers and LWS REST Clients to communicate over HTTP using REST conventions.
The following table maps LWS response to an HTTP status code and payload:
| LWS response | HTTP status code | HTTP payload |
|---|---|---|
| success | 200 | resource representation |
| not permitted | ... | |
| unknown requester | ... | |
| unknown error | ... | |
| created | 201 |
Define how resources are identified and addressed within the LWS Protocol, including URI schemes, resource naming conventions, and resolution mechanisms. This section may be moved within another section; e.g. Resource Access
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The features described in this section are being drafted to ground discussions and may be removed if there is:
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Define mechanisms for content negotiation based on profiles, allowing clients to request specific representations or views of resources (e.g., JSON-LD contexts, different RDF serializations, or application-specific profiles).
this left intentionally blank
Define notification mechanisms that allow clients to be informed of changes to resources, including subscription models, event formats, and delivery mechanisms.
this left intentionally blank
Define inbox resources with specific semantics within LWS, including message posting, retrieval, and management capabilities for asynchronous communication patterns.
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Describe considerations for ensuring LWS implementations can work across different platforms, environments, and storage backends while maintaining interoperability - and provide affordances to enable change in storage providers
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Formal security considerations section covering threat models, security requirements, and implementation guidance for secure LWS deployments.
All communications related to requesting, retrieving and presenting end-user credentials between clients and servers must use TLS-protected connections.
End-user credentials are vulnerable to theft and replay. Tokens should have a reasonably short lifetime, such as 3600 seconds (1 hour).
Clients that persist end-user credentials must take great care to store these tokens securely. Tokens should never be stored unencrypted in a browser's localStorage, in URLs or in logs.
This section is non-normative.
Privacy implications of the LWS Protocol, including data minimization, user consent, and privacy-preserving implementation patterns.
End-user
credentials
Credentials
carry
information
about
users.
users
and
agents.
While
digital
signatures
can
protect
end-user
credentials
against
tampering,
it
is
possible
for
clients
or
other
third
parties
to
read
the
values
inside
an
unencrypted
credential.
As
a
result,
credential
issuers
should
are
encouraged
to
create
end-user
credentials
tokens
that
contain
only
the
information
necessary
for
authentication.
Avoid
including
sensitive
attributes
unless
required.
Implementations
should
not
log
the
full
contents
of
an
end-user
credential.
If
logging
is
necessary,
tokens
should
be
truncated
authentication
or
hashed.
14.2
Authorization
Privacy
Minimal
Disclosure:
Authorization
servers
should
issue
tokens
containing
only
information
necessary
for
authorization.
Avoid
authorization,
and
to
avoid
including
sensitive
subject
attributes
unless
required.
Logging:
Implementations
should
not
log
full
token
contents.
If
logging
In
general,
it
is
an
anti-pattern
to
write
unencrypted
credential
data
to
a
log.
In
cases
where
this
is
necessary,
tokens
should
be
truncated
implementations
can
truncate
or
hashed.
hash
a
credential
to
preserve
the
privacy
of
the
credential
subject.
When
using
pseudonymous
identifiers
in
JWTs,
a
storage
server
may
still
be
able
to
correlate
requests
from
the
same
agent
over
time.
To
preserve
user
privacy
in
this
case,
a
client
applications
should
application
can
request
a
batch
issuance
of
JWTs
and
where
each
JWT
should
be
is
used
only
one
time
against
the
storage
server.
This
makes
it
harder
for
a
storage
server
to
use
pseudonymous
identifiers
to
correlate
requests.
time.
This
does
not
prevent
the
storage
server
from
using
other
information
such
as
similarities
in
JWT
content
or
originating
IP
address
to
correlate
requests.
When
using
pseudonymous
identifiers,
the
authorization
server
should
will
need
to
be
careful
not
to
issue
the
same
pseudonymous
identifier
more
than
once.
This section is non-normative.
This specification adds the following value to the "Well-Known URIs" registry [ IANA.well-known ] established by RFC 5785 [ RFC5785 ].
Referenced in: