Decentralized
identifiers
(DIDs)
are
a
new
type
of
identifier
that
enables
verifiable,
decentralized
digital
identity.
A
DID
refers
to
any
subject
(e.g.,
a
person,
organization,
thing,
data
model,
abstract
entity,
etc.)
as
determined
by
the
controller
of
the
DID
.
In
contrast
to
typical,
federated
identifiers,
DIDs
have
been
designed
so
that
they
may
be
decoupled
from
centralized
registries,
identity
providers,
and
certificate
authorities.
Specifically,
while
other
parties
might
be
used
to
help
enable
the
discovery
of
information
related
to
a
DID
,
the
design
enables
the
controller
of
a
DID
to
prove
control
over
it
without
requiring
permission
from
any
other
party.
DIDs
are
URIs
that
associate
a
DID
subject
with
a
DID
document
allowing
trustable
interactions
associated
with
that
subject.
This
document
specifies
the
DID
syntax,
a
common
data
model,
core
properties,
serialized
representations,
DID
operations,
and
an
explanation
of
the
process
of
resolving
DIDs
to
the
resources
that
they
represent.
Status
of
This
Document
This
is
a
preview
Do
not
attempt
to
implement
this
version
of
the
specification.
Do
not
reference
this
version
as
authoritative
in
any
way.
Instead,
see
https://w3c.github.io/did/
for
the
Editor's
draft.
This
section
describes
the
status
of
this
document
at
the
time
of
its
publication.
A
list
of
current
W3C
publications
and
the
latest
revision
of
this
technical
report
can
be
found
in
the
W3C
standards
and
drafts
index
.
This
version
of
the
DID
Core
specification,
version
1.1,
is
experimental.
DO
NOT
implement
it.
If
you
want
to
implement
DIDs,
use
the
current
version
1.0
specification:
Decentralized
Identifiers
(DIDs)
v1.0
.
Publication
as
a
Candidate
Recommendation
does
not
imply
endorsement
by
W3C
and
its
Members.
A
Candidate
Recommendation
Snapshot
has
received
wide
review
,
is
intended
to
gather
implementation
experience
,
and
has
commitments
from
Working
Group
members
to
royalty-free
licensing
for
implementations.
This
Candidate
Recommendation
is
not
expected
to
advance
to
Proposed
Recommendation
any
earlier
than
30
January
2026.
As
individuals
and
organizations,
many
of
us
use
globally
unique
identifiers
in
a
wide
variety
of
contexts.
They
serve
as
communications
addresses
(telephone
numbers,
email
addresses,
usernames
on
social
media),
ID
numbers
(for
passports,
drivers
licenses,
tax
IDs,
health
insurance),
and
product
identifiers
(serial
numbers,
barcodes,
RFIDs).
URIs
(Uniform
Resource
Identifiers)
are
used
for
resources
on
the
Web
and
each
web
page
you
view
in
a
browser
has
a
globally
unique
URL
(Uniform
Resource
Locator).
The
vast
majority
of
these
globally
unique
identifiers
are
not
under
our
control.
They
are
issued
by
external
authorities
that
decide
who
or
what
they
refer
to
and
when
they
can
be
revoked.
They
are
useful
only
in
certain
contexts
and
recognized
only
by
certain
bodies
not
of
our
choosing.
They
might
disappear
or
cease
to
be
valid
with
the
failure
of
an
organization.
They
might
unnecessarily
reveal
personal
information.
In
many
cases,
they
can
be
fraudulently
replicated
and
asserted
by
a
malicious
third-party,
which
is
more
commonly
known
as
"identity
theft".
The
Decentralized
Identifiers
(DIDs)
defined
in
this
specification
are
a
new
type
of
globally
unique
identifier.
They
are
designed
to
enable
individuals
and
organizations
to
generate
their
own
identifiers
using
systems
they
trust.
These
new
identifiers
enable
entities
to
prove
control
over
them
by
authenticating
using
cryptographic
proofs
such
as
digital
signatures.
Since
the
generation
and
assertion
of
Decentralized
Identifiers
is
entity-controlled,
each
entity
can
have
as
many
DIDs
as
necessary
to
maintain
their
desired
separation
of
identities,
personas,
and
interactions.
The
use
of
these
identifiers
can
be
scoped
appropriately
to
different
contexts.
They
support
interactions
with
other
people,
institutions,
or
systems
that
require
entities
to
identify
themselves,
or
things
they
control,
while
providing
control
over
how
much
personal
or
private
data
should
be
revealed,
all
without
depending
on
a
central
authority
to
guarantee
the
continued
existence
of
the
identifier.
These
ideas
are
explored
in
the
DID
Use
Cases
document
[
DID-USE-CASES
].
This
specification
does
not
presuppose
any
particular
technology
or
cryptography
to
underpin
the
generation,
persistence,
resolution,
or
interpretation
of
DIDs.
For
example,
implementers
can
create
Decentralized
Identifiers
based
on
identifiers
registered
in
federated
or
centralized
identity
management
systems.
Indeed,
almost
all
types
of
identifier
systems
can
add
support
for
DIDs.
This
creates
an
interoperability
bridge
between
the
worlds
of
centralized,
federated,
and
decentralized
identifiers.
This
also
enables
implementers
to
design
specific
types
of
DIDs
to
work
with
the
computing
infrastructure
they
trust,
such
as
distributed
ledgers,
decentralized
file
systems,
distributed
databases,
and
peer-to-peer
networks.
This
specification
is
for:
Anyone
that
wants
to
understand
the
core
architectural
principles
that
are
the
foundation
for
Decentralized
Identifiers;
Software
developers
that
want
to
produce
and
consume
Decentralized
Identifiers
and
their
associated
data
formats;
Systems
integrators
that
want
to
understand
how
to
use
Decentralized
Identifiers
in
their
software
and
hardware
systems;
Specification
authors
that
want
to
create
new
DID
infrastructures,
known
as
DID
methods,
that
conform
to
the
ecosystem
described
by
this
document.
In
addition
to
this
specification,
readers
might
find
the
Use
Cases
and
Requirements
for
Decentralized
Identifiers
[
DID-USE-CASES
]
document
useful.
1.1
A
Simple
Example
This
section
is
non-normative.
A
DID
is
a
simple
text
string
consisting
of
three
parts:
1)
the
did
URI
scheme
identifier,
2)
the
identifier
for
the
DID
method
,
and
3)
the
DID
method-specific
identifier.
Figure
1
A
simple
example
of
a
decentralized
identifier
(DID)
{
"@context": "https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1.1",
"id": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi",
"authentication": [{
// used to authenticate as did:...fghi
"id": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi#keys-1",
"type": "Multikey",
"controller": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi",
"publicKeyMultibase": "z6MkmM42vxfqZQsv4ehtTjFFxQ4sQKS2w6WR7emozFAn5cxu"
}]
}
1.2
Design
Goals
This
section
is
non-normative.
Decentralized
Identifiers
are
a
component
of
larger
systems,
such
as
the
Verifiable
Credentials
ecosystem
[
VC-DATA-MODEL
],
which
influenced
the
design
goals
for
this
specification.
The
design
goals
for
Decentralized
Identifiers
are
summarized
here.
Goal
Description
Decentralization
Eliminate
the
requirement
for
centralized
authorities
or
single
points
of
failure
in
identifier
management,
including
the
registration
of
globally
unique
identifiers,
public
verification
keys,
services
,
and
other
information.
Control
Give
entities,
both
human
and
non-human,
the
power
to
directly
control
their
digital
identifiers
without
the
need
to
rely
on
external
authorities.
Privacy
Enable
entities
to
control
the
privacy
of
their
information,
including
minimal,
selective,
and
progressive
disclosure
of
attributes
or
other
data.
Security
Enable
sufficient
security
for
requesting
parties
to
depend
on
DID
documents
for
their
required
level
of
assurance.
Proof-based
Enable
DID
controllers
to
provide
cryptographic
proof
when
interacting
with
other
entities.
Discoverability
Make
it
possible
for
entities
to
discover
DIDs
for
other
entities,
to
learn
more
about
or
interact
with
those
entities.
Interoperability
Use
interoperable
standards
so
DID
infrastructure
can
make
use
of
existing
tools
and
software
libraries
designed
for
interoperability.
Portability
Be
system-
and
network-independent
and
enable
entities
to
use
their
digital
identifiers
with
any
system
that
supports
DIDs
and
DID
methods
.
Simplicity
Favor
a
reduced
set
of
simple
features
to
make
the
technology
easier
to
understand,
implement,
and
deploy.
Extensibility
Where
possible,
enable
extensibility
provided
it
does
not
greatly
hinder
interoperability,
portability,
or
simplicity.
1.3
Architecture
Overview
This
section
is
non-normative.
This
section
provides
a
basic
overview
of
the
major
components
of
Decentralized
Identifier
architecture.
Six
internally-labeled
shapes
appear
in
the
diagram,
with
labeled
arrows
between
them,
as
follows.
In
the
center
of
the
diagram
is
a
rectangle
labeled
DID
URL,
containing
small
typewritten
text
"did:example:123/path/to/rsrc".
At
the
center
top
of
the
diagram
is
a
rectangle
labeled,
"DID",
containing
small
typewritten
text
"did:example:123".
At
the
top
left
of
the
diagram
is
an
oval,
labeled
"DID
Subject".
At
the
bottom
center
of
the
diagram
is
a
rectangle
labeled,
"DID
document".
At
the
bottom
left
is
an
oval,
labeled,
"DID
Controller".
On
the
center
right
of
the
diagram
is
a
two-dimensional
rendering
of
a
cylinder,
labeled,
"Verifiable
Data
Registry".
From
the
top
of
the
"DID
URL"
rectangle,
an
arrow,
labeled
"contains",
extends
upwards,
pointing
to
the
"DID"
rectangle.
From
the
bottom
of
the
"DID
URL"
rectangle,
an
arrow,
labeled
"refers,
and
dereferences
,
to",
extends
downward,
pointing
to
the
"DID
document"
rectangle.
An
arrow
from
the
"DID"
rectangle,
labeled
"
resolves
to",
points
down
to
the
"DID
document"
rectangle.
An
arrow
from
the
"DID"
rectangle,
labeled
"refers
to",
points
left
to
the
"DID
subject"
oval.
An
arrow
from
the
"DID
controller"
oval,
labeled
"controls",
points
right
to
the
"DID
document"
rectangle.
An
arrow
from
the
"DID"
rectangle,
labeled
"recorded
on",
points
downards
to
the
right,
to
the
"Verifiable
Data
Registry"
cylinder.
An
arrow
from
the
"DID
document"
rectangle,
labeled
"recorded
on",
points
upwards
to
the
right
to
the
"Verifiable
Data
Registry"
cylinder.
The
subject
of
a
DID
is,
by
definition,
the
entity
identified
by
the
DID
.
The
DID
subject
might
also
be
the
DID
controller
.
Anything
can
be
the
subject
of
a
DID
:
person,
group,
organization,
thing,
or
concept.
This
is
further
defined
in
5.1.1
DID
Subject
.
DID
controllers
The
controller
of
a
DID
is
the
entity
(person,
organization,
or
autonomous
software)
that
has
the
capability—as
defined
by
a
DID
method
—to
make
changes
to
a
DID
document
.
This
capability
is
typically
asserted
by
the
control
of
a
set
of
cryptographic
keys
used
by
software
acting
on
behalf
of
the
controller,
though
it
might
also
be
asserted
via
other
mechanisms.
Note
that
a
DID
might
have
more
than
one
controller,
and
the
DID
subject
can
be
the
DID
controller
,
or
one
of
them.
This
concept
is
documented
in
5.1.2
DID
Controller
.
Verifiable
data
registries
In
order
to
be
resolvable
to
DID
documents
,
DIDs
are
typically
recorded
on
an
underlying
system
or
network
of
some
kind.
Regardless
of
the
specific
technology
used,
any
such
system
that
supports
recording
DIDs
and
returning
data
necessary
to
produce
DID
documents
is
called
a
verifiable
data
registry
.
Examples
include
distributed
ledgers
,
decentralized
file
systems,
databases
of
any
kind,
peer-to-peer
networks,
and
other
forms
of
trusted
data
storage.
This
concept
is
further
elaborated
upon
in
7.
Methods
.
DID
methods
are
the
mechanism
by
which
a
particular
type
of
DID
and
its
associated
DID
document
are
created,
resolved,
updated,
and
deactivated.
DID
methods
are
defined
using
separate
DID
method
specifications
as
defined
in
7.
Methods
.
As
well
as
sections
marked
as
non-normative,
all
authoring
guidelines,
diagrams,
examples,
and
notes
in
this
specification
are
non-normative.
Everything
else
in
this
specification
is
normative.
The
key
words
MAY
,
MUST
,
MUST
NOT
,
RECOMMENDED
,
SHOULD
,
and
SHOULD
NOT
in
this
document
are
to
be
interpreted
as
described
in
BCP
14
[
RFC2119
]
[
RFC8174
]
when,
and
only
when,
they
appear
in
all
capitals,
as
shown
here.
This
document
contains
examples
that
contain
JSON
and
JSON-LD
content.
Some
of
these
examples
contain
characters
that
are
invalid,
such
as
inline
comments
(
//
)
and
the
use
of
ellipsis
(
...
)
to
denote
information
that
adds
little
value
to
the
example.
Implementers
are
cautioned
to
remove
this
content
if
they
desire
to
use
the
information
as
valid
JSON
or
JSON-LD.
Some
examples
contain
terms,
both
property
names
and
values,
that
are
not
defined
in
this
specification.
These
are
indicated
with
a
comment
(
//
external
(property
name|value)
).
Such
terms,
when
used
in
a
DID
document
,
are
expected
to
be
registered
in
the
repository
of
DID
Extensions
[
DID-EXTENSIONS
]
with
links
to
both
a
formal
definition
and
a
JSON-LD
context.
Interoperability
of
implementations
for
DIDs
and
DID
documents
is
tested
by
evaluating
an
implementation's
ability
to
create
and
parse
DIDs
and
DID
documents
that
conform
to
this
specification.
Interoperability
for
producers
and
consumers
of
DIDs
and
DID
documents
is
provided
by
ensuring
the
DIDs
and
DID
documents
conform.
Interoperability
for
DID
method
specifications
is
provided
by
the
details
in
each
DID
method
specification.
It
is
understood
that,
in
the
same
way
that
a
web
browser
is
not
required
to
implement
all
known
URI
schemes,
conformant
software
that
works
with
DIDs
is
not
required
to
implement
all
known
DID
methods
.
However,
all
implementations
of
a
given
DID
method
are
expected
to
be
interoperable
for
that
method.
A
conforming
DID
is
any
concrete
expression
of
the
rules
specified
in
3.
Identifier
which
complies
with
relevant
normative
statements
in
that
section.
A
conforming
DID
document
is
any
concrete
expression
of
the
data
model
described
in
this
specification
which
complies
with
the
relevant
normative
statements
in
4.
Data
Model
and
5.
Core
Properties
.
A
serialization
format
for
the
conforming
document
is
deterministic,
bi-directional,
and
lossless,
as
described
in
6.
Representations
.
A
conforming
DID
method
is
any
specification
that
complies
with
the
relevant
normative
statements
in
7.
Methods
.
1.5
Audience
This
section
is
non-normative.
This
specification
has
two
primary
audiences:
implementers
of
conformant
DID
methods;
and
implementers
of
systems
and
services
that
wish
to
interact
and
interface
with
DIDs.
The
intended
audience
includes,
but
is
not
limited
to,
software
architects,
data
modelers,
application
developers,
service
developers,
testers,
operators,
and
user
experience
(UX)
specialists.
Other
people
involved
in
a
broad
range
of
standards
efforts
related
to
decentralized
identity,
verifiable
credentials,
and
secure
storage
might
also
be
interested
in
reading
this
specification.
2.
Terminology
This
section
is
non-normative.
This
section
defines
the
terms
used
in
this
specification
and
throughout
decentralized
identifier
infrastructure.
A
link
to
these
terms
is
included
whenever
they
appear
in
this
specification.
amplification
attack
A
class
of
attack
where
the
attacker
attempts
to
exhaust
a
target
system's
CPU,
storage,
network,
or
other
resources
by
providing
small,
valid
inputs
into
the
system
that
result
in
damaging
effects
that
can
be
exponentially
more
costly
to
process
than
the
inputs
themselves.
decentralized
identifier
(DID)
A
globally
unique
persistent
identifier
that
does
not
require
a
centralized
registration
authority
and
is
often
generated
and/or
registered
cryptographically.
The
generic
format
of
a
DID
is
defined
in
3.1
DID
Syntax
.
A
specific
DID
scheme
is
defined
in
a
DID
method
specification.
Many—but
not
all—DID
methods
make
use
of
distributed
ledger
technology
(DLT)
or
some
other
form
of
decentralized
network.
DID
controller
An
entity
that
has
the
capability
to
make
changes
to
a
DID
document
.
A
DID
might
have
more
than
one
DID
controller.
The
DID
controller(s)
can
be
denoted
by
the
optional
controller
property
at
the
top
level
of
the
DID
document
.
Note
that
a
DID
controller
might
be
the
DID
subject
.
DID
delegate
An
entity
to
whom
a
DID
controller
has
granted
permission
to
use
a
verification
method
associated
with
a
DID
via
a
DID
document
.
For
example,
a
parent
who
controls
a
child's
DID
document
might
permit
the
child
to
use
their
personal
device
in
order
to
authenticate
.
In
this
case,
the
child
is
the
DID
delegate
.
The
child's
personal
device
would
contain
the
private
cryptographic
material
enabling
the
child
to
authenticate
using
the
DID
.
However,
the
child
might
not
be
permitted
to
add
other
personal
devices
without
the
parent's
permission.
The
portion
of
a
DID
URL
that
follows
the
first
hash
sign
character
(
#
).
DID
fragment
syntax
is
identical
to
URI
fragment
syntax.
DID
method
A
definition
of
how
a
specific
DID
method
scheme
is
implemented.
A
DID
method
is
defined
by
a
DID
method
specification,
which
specifies
the
precise
operations
by
which
DIDs
and
DID
documents
are
created,
resolved,
updated,
and
deactivated.
See
7.
Methods
.
DID
path
The
portion
of
a
DID
URL
that
begins
with
and
includes
the
first
forward
slash
(
/
)
character
and
ends
with
either
a
question
mark
(
?
)
character,
a
fragment
hash
sign
(
#
)
character,
or
the
end
of
the
DID
URL
.
DID
path
syntax
is
identical
to
URI
path
syntax.
See
Path
.
DID
query
The
portion
of
a
DID
URL
that
follows
and
includes
the
first
question
mark
character
(
?
).
DID
query
syntax
is
identical
to
URI
query
syntax.
See
Query
.
DID
resolution
The
process
that
takes
as
its
input
a
DID
and
a
set
of
resolution
options
and
returns
a
DID
document
in
a
conforming
representation
plus
additional
metadata.
This
process
relies
on
the
"Read"
operation
of
the
applicable
DID
method
.
The
inputs
and
outputs
of
this
process
are
defined
in
[
DID-RESOLUTION
].
The
formal
syntax
of
a
decentralized
identifier
.
The
generic
DID
scheme
begins
with
the
prefix
did:
as
defined
in
3.1
DID
Syntax
.
Each
DID
method
specification
defines
a
specific
DID
method
scheme
that
works
with
that
specific
DID
method
.
In
a
specific
DID
method
scheme,
the
DID
method
name
follows
the
first
colon
and
terminates
with
the
second
colon,
e.g.,
did:example:
DID
subject
The
entity
identified
by
a
DID
and
described
by
a
DID
document
.
Anything
can
be
a
DID
subject:
person,
group,
organization,
physical
thing,
digital
thing,
logical
thing,
etc.
DID
URL
A
DID
plus
any
additional
syntactic
component
that
conforms
to
the
definition
in
3.2
DID
URL
Syntax
.
This
includes
an
optional
DID
path
(with
its
leading
/
character),
optional
DID
query
(with
its
leading
?
character),
and
optional
DID
fragment
(with
its
leading
#
character).
DID
URL
dereferencing
The
process
that
takes
as
its
input
a
DID
URL
and
a
set
of
input
metadata,
and
returns
a
resource
.
This
resource
might
be
a
DID
document
plus
additional
metadata,
a
secondary
resource
contained
within
the
DID
document
,
or
a
resource
entirely
external
to
the
DID
document
.
The
process
uses
DID
resolution
to
fetch
a
DID
document
indicated
by
the
DID
contained
within
the
DID
URL
.
The
dereferencing
process
can
then
perform
additional
processing
on
the
DID
document
to
return
the
dereferenced
resource
indicated
by
the
DID
URL
.
The
inputs
and
outputs
of
this
process
are
defined
in
[
DID-RESOLUTION
].
A
non-centralized
system
for
recording
events.
These
systems
establish
sufficient
confidence
for
participants
to
rely
upon
the
data
recorded
by
others
to
make
operational
decisions.
They
typically
use
distributed
databases
where
different
nodes
use
a
consensus
protocol
to
confirm
the
ordering
of
cryptographically
signed
transactions.
The
linking
of
digitally
signed
transactions
over
time
often
makes
the
history
of
the
ledger
effectively
immutable.
resource
A
thing
that
is
identified
by
a
URI
,
as
defined
in
[
RFC3986
].
Similarly,
any
resource
might
serve
as
a
DID
subject
identified
by
a
DID
.
representation
A
concrete
expression
of
a
resource
,
as
defined
by
[
RFC9110
]:
"information
that
is
intended
to
reflect
a
past,
current,
or
desired
state
of
a
given
resource,
in
a
format
that
can
be
readily
communicated
via
the
protocol.
A
representation
consists
of
a
set
of
representation
metadata
and
a
potentially
unbounded
stream
of
representation
data."
A
DID
document
is
a
representation
of
information
describing
a
DID
subject
.
See
6.
Representations
.
A
means
of
communicating
or
interacting
with
the
DID
subject
or
associated
entities
via
one
or
more
service
endpoints
.
Examples
include
discovery
services,
agent
services,
social
networking
services,
file
storage
services,
and
verifiable
credential
repository
services.
did
service
endpoint
A
network
address,
such
as
an
HTTP
URL,
at
which
services
operate
on
behalf
of
a
DID
subject
.
Uniform
Resource
Identifier
(URI)
The
standard
identifier
format
for
all
resources
on
the
World
Wide
Web
as
defined
by
[
RFC3986
].
A
DID
is
a
type
of
URI
scheme.
verifiable
data
registry
A
system
that
facilitates
the
creation,
verification,
updating,
and/or
deactivation
of
decentralized
identifiers
and
DID
documents
.
A
verifiable
data
registry
might
also
be
used
for
other
cryptographically-verifiable
data
structures
such
as
verifiable
credentials
.
For
more
information,
see
the
W3C
Verifiable
Credentials
specification
[
VC-DATA-MODEL
].
verifiable
timestamp
A
verifiable
timestamp
enables
a
third-party
to
verify
that
a
data
object
existed
at
a
specific
moment
in
time
and
that
it
has
not
been
modified
or
corrupted
since
that
moment
in
time. If
the
data
integrity
could
reasonably
have
been
modified
or
corrupted
since
that
moment
in
time,
the
timestamp
is
not
verifiable.
In
addition
to
the
terminology
above,
this
specification
also
uses
terminology
from
the
[
INFRA
]
specification
to
formally
define
the
data
model
.
When
[
INFRA
]
terminology
is
used,
such
as
string
,
set
,
and
map
,
it
is
linked
directly
to
that
specification.
The
generic
DID
scheme
is
a
URI
scheme
conformant
with
[
RFC3986
].
The
ABNF
definition
can
be
found
below,
which
uses
the
syntax
in
[
RFC5234
]
and
the
corresponding
definitions
for
ALPHA
and
DIGIT
.
All
other
rule
names
not
defined
in
the
ABNF
below
are
defined
in
[
RFC3986
].
All
DIDs
MUST
conform
to
the
DID
Syntax
ABNF
Rules.
did-url
=
did
path-abempty
[
"?"
query
]
[
"#"
fragment
]
Note
:
Semicolon
character
is
reserved
for
future
use
Although
the
semicolon
(
;
)
character
can
be
used
according
to
the
rules
of
the
DID
URL
syntax,
future
versions
of
this
specification
may
use
it
as
a
sub-delimiter
for
parameters
as
described
in
[
MATRIX-URIS
].
To
avoid
future
conflicts,
developers
ought
to
refrain
from
using
it.
Note
:
Avoid
comparison
of
DID
URLs
containing
multiple
query
parameters
Implementers
are
urged
to
avoid
comparing
DID
URLs
for
equivalence
when
they
have
more
than
one
query
parameter
without
a
specification
specifically
designed
for
that
purpose.
This
specification
defines
no
normalization
rules
for
query
parameters,
and
any
query
parameter
normalization
rules
defined
at
the
DID
Method
specification
or
application
layer
are
not
universally
recognized
rules.
A
DID
fragment
is
used
as
a
method-independent
reference
into
a
DID
document
or
external
resource
.
Some
examples
of
DID
fragment
identifiers
are
shown
below.
Example
4
:
A
unique
verification
method
in
a
DID
Document
A
relative
DID
URL
is
any
URL
value
in
a
DID
document
that
does
not
start
with
did:<method-name>:<method-specific-id>
.
More
specifically,
it
is
any
URL
value
that
does
not
start
with
the
ABNF
defined
in
3.1
DID
Syntax
.
The
URL
is
expected
to
reference
a
resource
in
the
same
DID
document
.
Relative
DID
URLs
MAY
contain
relative
path
components,
query
parameters,
and
fragment
identifiers.
{
"@context": "https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1.1",
"id": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi",
"verificationMethod": [{
"id": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi#key-1",
"type": "Multikey", // external (property value)
"controller": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi",
"publicKeyMultibase": "z6MkmM42vxfqZQsv4ehtTjFFxQ4sQKS2w6WR7emozFAn5cxu"
}, ...],
"authentication": [
// a relative DID URL used to reference a verification method above
"#key-1"
]
}
In
the
example
above,
the
relative
DID
URL
value
will
be
transformed
to
an
absolute
DID
URL
value
of
did:example:123456789abcdefghi#key-1
.
4.
Data
Model
This
specification
defines
a
data
model
that
can
be
used
to
express
DID
documents
and
their
internal
data
structures,
which
can
then
be
serialized
into
a
concrete
expression.
This
section
provides
a
high-level
description
of
the
data
model,
descriptions
of
the
ways
different
types
of
properties
are
expressed
in
the
data
model,
and
instructions
for
extending
the
data
model.
All
entry
keys
in
the
DID
document
data
model
are
strings
.
All
entry
values
are
expressed
using
one
of
the
data
types
in
the
table
below,
and
each
representation
specifies
the
concrete
serialization
format
of
each
data
type.
A
finite
ordered
sequence
of
key/value
pairs,
with
no
key
appearing
twice
as
specified
in
the
Infra
Standard
.
A
map
is
sometimes
referred
to
as
an
ordered
map
in
the
Infra
Standard
.
A
finite
ordered
sequence
of
items
that
does
not
contain
the
same
item
twice
as
specified
in
the
Infra
Standard
.
A
set
is
sometimes
referred
to
as
an
ordered
set
in
the
Infra
Standard
.
datetime
A
date
and
time
value
that
is
capable
of
losslessly
expressing
all
values
expressible
by
a
dateTime
as
specified
in
[
XMLSCHEMA11-2
].
A
value
that
is
used
to
indicate
the
lack
of
a
value
as
defined
in
the
Infra
Standard
.
As
a
result
of
the
data
model
being
defined
using
terminology
from
the
Infra
Standard
,
property
values
which
can
contain
more
than
one
item,
such
as
lists
,
maps
,
and
sets
,
are
explicitly
ordered.
All
list-like
value
structures
in
the
Infra
Standard
are
ordered,
whether
or
not
that
order
is
significant.
For
the
purposes
of
this
specification,
unless
otherwise
stated,
ordering
of
a
map
or
set
is
not
important
and
implementations
are
not
expected
to
produce
or
consume
deterministically
ordered
values.
4.1
Extensibility
The
data
model
supports
two
types
of
extensibility.
For
maximum
interoperability,
it
is
RECOMMENDED
that
extensions
use
the
repository
of
Decentralized
Identifier
Extensions
.
The
use
of
this
mechanism
for
new
properties
or
other
extensions
is
the
only
specified
mechanism
that
ensures
that
two
different
representations
will
be
able
to
work
together.
It
is
always
possible
for
two
specific
implementations
to
agree
out-of-band
to
use
a
mutually
understood
extension
or
representation
that
is
not
recorded
in
the
repository
of
Decentralized
Identifier
Extensions
;
interoperability
between
such
implementations
and
the
larger
ecosystem
will
be
less
reliable.
The
following
tables
contain
informative
references
for
the
core
properties
defined
by
this
specification,
with
expected
values,
and
whether
or
not
they
are
required.
The
property
names
in
the
tables
are
linked
to
the
normative
definitions
and
more
detailed
descriptions
of
each
property.
Note
:
Property
names
used
in
maps
of
different
types
The
property
names
id
,
type
,
and
controller
can
be
present
in
maps
of
different
types
with
possible
differences
in
constraints.
For
example,
an
id
at
the
top-level
of
a
DID
document
is
required
to
be
a
DID,
while
an
id
in
a
service
map
can
be
a
URL.
Identifiers
used
in
a
DID
document
to
identify
a
DID
subject
or
a
DID
Controller
cannot
use
query
parameters
or
fragment
identifiers.
Implementers
are
urged
to
pay
particular
attention
to
the
list
of
allowable
characters
in
Section
3.1
DID
Syntax
which
makes
this
requirement
clear;
the
syntax
does
not
include
the
?
character
nor
the
#
character.
This
is
in
contrast
to
identifiers
used
in
a
DID
document
to
identify
a
verification
method
or
a
service
,
which
follow
the
syntax
rules
in
Section
3.2
DID
URL
Syntax
,
which
do
allow
the
use
of
query
parameters
and
fragment
identifiers.
Even
so,
the
use
of
query
parameters
in
long-lived
canonical
identifiers
made
for
DID
ecosystems
is
discouraged
as
it
can
increase
the
complexity
of
DID
resolution
software
and
potentially
lead
to
a
larger
security
attack
surface.
Fragment
identifiers
are
also
expected
to
be
unique
within
a
particular
DID
document
and
implementers
are
discouraged
from
reusing
them
to
refer
to
different
resources
over
time,
such
as
two
different
verification
methods
within
the
same
DID
document
.
A
concrete
serialization
of
a
DID
document
in
this
specification
is
called
a
representation
.
A
representation
is
created
by
serializing
the
data
model
through
a
process
called
production
.
A
representation
is
transformed
into
the
data
model
through
a
process
called
consumption
.
The
production
and
consumption
processes
enable
the
conversion
of
information
from
one
representation
to
another.
This
specification
defines
a
single
representation
for
JSON,
which
is
also
compatible
with
processors
that
perform
JSON-LD
processing.
The
following
sections
define
the
general
rules
for
production
and
consumption
,
as
well
as
the
JSON
representation
.
A
representation
MUST
be
uniquely
associated
with
an
IANA-registered
Media
Type.
A
representation
MUST
define
fragment
processing
rules
for
its
Media
Type
that
are
conformant
with
the
fragment
processing
rules
defined
in
Fragment
.
A
representation
SHOULD
use
the
lexical
representation
of
data
model
data
types.
For
example,
JSON
and
JSON-LD
use
the
XML
Schema
dateTime
lexical
serialization
to
represent
datetimes
.
A
representation
MAY
choose
to
serialize
the
data
model
data
types
using
a
different
lexical
serializations
as
long
as
the
consumption
process
back
into
the
data
model
is
lossless.
For
example,
some
CBOR-based
representations
express
datetime
values
using
integers
to
represent
the
number
of
seconds
since
the
Unix
epoch.
The
upper
left
quadrant
of
the
diagram
contains
a
rectangle
with
dashed
grey
outline,
containing
two
blue-outlined
rectangles,
one
above
the
other.
The
upper,
larger
rectangle
is
labeled,
in
blue,
"Core
Properties",
and
contains
the
following
INFRA
notation:
The
lower,
smaller
rectangle
is
labeled,
in
blue,
"Core
Representation-specific
Entries
(JSON-LD)",
and
contains
the
following
monospaced
INFRA
notation:
From
the
grey-outlined
rectangle,
three
pairs
of
arrows
extend
to
three
different
black-outlined
rectangles,
one
on
the
upper
right
of
the
diagram,
one
in
the
lower
right,
and
one
in
the
lower
left.
Each
pair
of
arrows
consists
of
one
blue
arrow
pointing
from
the
grey-outlined
rectangle
to
the
respective
black-outlined
rectangle,
labeled
"produce",
and
one
red
arrow
pointing
in
the
reverse
direction,
labeled
"consume".
The
black-outlined
rectangle
in
the
upper
right
is
labeled
"application/did+cbor",
and
contains
hexadecimal
data.
The
rectangle
in
the
lower
right
is
labeled
"application/did",
and
contains
the
following
JSON
data:
An
implementation
is
expected
to
convert
between
representations
by
using
the
consumption
rules
on
the
source
representation
resulting
in
the
data
model
and
then
using
the
production
rules
to
serialize
data
model
to
the
target
representation,
or
any
other
mechanism
that
results
in
the
same
target
representation.
A
JSON
Object
,
where
each
entry
is
serialized
as
a
member
of
the
JSON
Object
with
the
entry
key
as
a
JSON
String
member
name
and
the
entry
value
according
to
its
type,
as
defined
in
this
table.
All
entries
of
a
DID
document
MUST
be
included
in
the
root
JSON
Object
.
Entries
MAY
contain
additional
data
substructures
subject
to
the
value
representation
rules
in
the
list
above.
When
serializing
a
DID
document
,
a
conforming
producer
MUST
specify
a
media
type
of
application/did
to
downstream
applications.
Example
9
:
Example
DID
document
in
JSON
representation
A
map
,
where
each
member
of
the
JSON
Object
is
added
as
an
entry
to
the
map.
Each
entry
key
is
set
as
the
JSON
Object
member
name.
Each
entry
value
is
set
by
converting
the
JSON
Object
member
value
according
to
the
JSON
representation
type
as
defined
in
this
table.
Since
order
is
not
specified
by
JSON
Objects,
no
insertion
order
is
guaranteed.
A
list
,
where
each
value
of
the
JSON
Array
is
added
to
the
list
in
order,
converted
based
on
the
JSON
representation
type
of
the
array
value,
as
defined
in
this
table.
A
set
,
where
each
value
of
the
JSON
Array
is
added
to
the
set
in
order,
converted
based
on
the
JSON
representation
type
of
the
array
value,
as
defined
in
this
table.
JSON-LD
is
a
JSON-based
format
used
to
serialize
Linked
Data
.
Some
implementations
are
expected
to
process
DID
documents
using
the
standard
JSON-LD
Processing
algorithms.
To
maximize
interoperability,
implementers
are
strongly
advised
to
ensure
that
JSON-LD
Processing
using
standards-compliant
libraries
is
not
prevented.
The
semantics
of
a
DID
document
are
the
same
whether
JSON-LD
Processing
using
standards-compliant
libraries
is
performed
or
not.
Any
difference
in
semantics
is
an
error
in
either
implementation
or
DID
Method
specification.
For
JSON-LD
processing
to
occur,
a
@context
property
MUST
be
specified
according
to
the
rules
specified
in
the
JSON-LD
1.1
specification.
In
addition
to
using
the
JSON
representation
production
rules,
production
MUST
include
the
@context
entry.
The
serialized
value
of
@context
MUST
be
the
JSON
String
https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1.1
,
or
a
JSON
Array
where
the
first
item
is
the
JSON
String
https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1.1
and
the
subsequent
items
are
serialized
according
to
the
JSON
production
rules.
Example
10
:
A
valid
serialization
of
a
simple
@context
entry
All
implementers
creating
conforming
consumers
that
produce
or
consume
representations
meant
to
be
processed
as
JSON-LD
are
advised
to
ensure
that
their
algorithms
produce
valid
JSON-LD
documents.
Invalid
JSON-LD
documents
will
cause
JSON-LD
processors
to
halt
and
report
errors.
Media
types,
as
defined
in
[
RFC6838
],
identify
the
syntax
used
to
express
a
DID
document
as
well
as
other
useful
processing
guidelines.
Syntaxes
used
to
express
the
data
model
in
this
specification
SHOULD
be
identified
by
a
media
type,
and
conventions
outlined
in
this
section
SHOULD
be
followed
when
defining
or
using
media
types
with
DID
documents
.
There
is
one
media
type
associated
with
the
core
data
model,
which
is
listed
in
Section
E.
IANA
Considerations
:
application/did
.
6.3.1
Media
Type
Precision
This
section
is
non-normative.
At
times,
developers
or
systems
might
use
lower-precision
media
types
to
convey
DID
documents
.
Some
of
the
reasons
for
use
of
lower-precision
media
types
include:
A
web
server
defaults
to
text/plain
or
application/octet-stream
when
a
file
extension
is
not
available
and
it
cannot
determine
the
media
type.
A
developer
adds
a
file
extension
that
leads
to
a
media
type
that
is
less
specific
than
the
content
of
the
file.
For
example,
.json
could
result
in
a
media
type
of
application/json
and
.jsonld
might
result
in
a
media
type
of
application/ld+json
.
A
protocol
requires
a
less
precise
media
type
for
a
particular
transaction;
for
example,
application/json
instead
of
application/did
,
Implementers
are
discouraged
from
raising
errors
when
it
is
possible
to
determine
the
intended
media
type
from
the
payload,
provided
that
the
media
type
used
is
acceptable
in
the
given
protocol.
For
example,
if
an
application
only
accepts
payloads
that
conform
to
the
rules
associated
with
the
application/did
media
type,
but
the
payload
is
tagged
with
the
lower-precision
application/json
or
application/ld+json
,
the
application
might
perform
the
following
steps
to
determine
whether
the
payload
also
conforms
to
the
higher-precision
media
type:
Parse
the
payload
as
a
JSON
document.
Ensure
that
the
first
element
of
the
@context
property
matches
https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1.1
.
Assume
an
application/did
media
type
if
the
JSON
document
contains
a
top-level
id
property
containing
an
identifier
that
conforms
to
the
rules
in
Section
3.1
DID
Syntax
.
Whenever
possible,
implementers
are
advised
to
use
the
most
precise
(the
highest-
precision)
media
type
for
all
payloads
defined
by
this
specification.
Implementers
are
also
advised
to
recognize
that
a
payload
tagged
with
a
lower-
precision
media
type
does
not
mean
that
the
payload
does
not
meet
the
rules
necessary
to
tag
it
with
a
higher-precision
type.
Similarly,
a
payload
tagged
with
a
higher-precision
media
type
does
not
mean
that
the
payload
will
meet
the
requirements
associated
with
the
media
type.
Receivers
of
payloads,
regardless
of
their
associated
media
type,
are
expected
to
perform
appropriate
checks
to
ensure
that
payloads
conform
with
the
requirements
for
their
use
in
a
given
system.
HTTP
clients
and
servers
use
media
types
associated
with
DID
documents
in
Accept:
headers
and
when
indicating
content
types.
Implementers
are
warned
that
HTTP
servers
might
ignore
the
Accept:
header
and
return
another
content
type,
or
return
an
error
code
such
as
415
Unsupported
Media
Type
.
Conceptually,
the
relationship
between
this
specification
and
a
DID
method
specification
is
similar
to
the
relationship
between
the
IETF
generic
URI
specification
[
RFC3986
]
and
a
specific
URI
scheme
[
IANA-URI-SCHEMES
],
such
as
the
http
scheme
[
RFC9110
].
In
addition
to
defining
a
specific
DID
scheme
,
a
DID
method
specification
also
defines
the
mechanisms
for
creating,
resolving,
updating,
and
deactivating
DIDs
and
DID
documents
using
a
specific
type
of
verifiable
data
registry
.
It
also
documents
all
implementation
considerations
related
to
DIDs
as
well
as
Security
and
Privacy
Considerations.
This
section
specifies
the
requirements
for
authoring
DID
method
specifications.
7.1
Method
Syntax
The
requirements
for
all
DID
method
specifications
when
defining
the
method-specific
DID
Syntax
are
as
follows:
A
DID
method
specification
MUST
define
exactly
one
method-specific
DID
scheme
that
is
identified
by
exactly
one
method
name
as
specified
by
the
method-name
rule
in
3.1
DID
Syntax
.
The
DID
method
specification
MUST
specify
how
to
generate
the
method-specific-id
component
of
a
DID
.
The
DID
method
specification
MUST
define
sensitivity
and
normalization
of
the
value
of
the
method-specific-id
.
The
method-specific-id
value
MUST
be
unique
within
a
DID
method
.
The
method-specific-id
value
itself
might
be
globally
unique.
To
reduce
the
chances
of
method-name
conflicts,
a
DID
method
specification
SHOULD
be
registered
in
the
repository
of
DID
Extensions
[
DID-EXTENSIONS
].
A
DID
method
MAY
define
multiple
method-specific-id
formats.
The
method-specific-id
format
MAY
include
colons.
The
use
of
colons
MUST
comply
syntactically
with
the
method-specific-id
ABNF
rule.
A
DID
method
specification
MAY
specify
ABNF
rules
for
DID
paths
that
are
more
restrictive
than
the
generic
rules
in
Path
.
A
DID
method
specification
MAY
specify
ABNF
rules
for
DID
queries
that
are
more
restrictive
than
the
generic
rules
in
this
section.
A
DID
method
specification
MAY
specify
ABNF
rules
for
DID
fragments
that
are
more
restrictive
than
the
generic
rules
in
this
section.
Note
:
Colons
in
method-specific-id
The
meaning
of
colons
in
the
method-specific-id
is
entirely
method-specific.
Colons
might
be
used
by
DID
methods
for
establishing
hierarchically
partitioned
namespaces,
for
identifying
specific
instances
or
parts
of
the
verifiable
data
registry
,
or
for
other
purposes.
Implementers
are
advised
to
avoid
assuming
any
meanings
or
behaviors
associated
with
a
colon
that
are
generically
applicable
to
all
DID
methods
.
7.2
Method
Operations
The
requirements
for
all
DID
method
specifications
when
defining
the
method
operations
are
as
follows:
A
DID
method
specification
MUST
define
how
authorization
is
performed
to
execute
all
operations,
including
any
necessary
cryptographic
processes.
not
use
the
DID
document
for
this
decision
at
all,
and
depend
on
an
out-of-band
mechanism,
instead.
When
executing
method
operations,
a
DID
method
can
use
any
data
structures
it
requires,
including
intermediate,
partial,
or
temporary
DID
documents
,
as
long
as
they
are
kept
internal
to
the
DID
method,
and
the
DID
documents
returned
by
the
method
operations
are
fully
conformant,
as
defined
in
1.4
Conformance
.
7.3
Security
Requirements
The
requirements
for
all
DID
method
specifications
when
authoring
the
Security
Considerations
section
are
as
follows:
The
Security
Considerations
section
MUST
document
the
following
forms
of
attack
for
the
DID
operations
defined
in
the
DID
method
specification:
eavesdropping,
replay,
message
insertion,
deletion,
modification,
denial
of
service,
amplification
,
and
man-in-the-middle.
Other
known
forms
of
attack
SHOULD
also
be
documented.
The
Security
Considerations
section
MUST
discuss
residual
risks,
such
as
the
risks
from
compromise
in
a
related
protocol,
incorrect
implementation,
or
cipher
after
threat
mitigation
was
deployed.
The
Security
Considerations
section
MUST
provide
integrity
protection
and
update
authentication
for
all
operations
required
by
Section
7.2
Method
Operations
.
If
authentication
is
involved,
particularly
user-host
authentication,
the
security
characteristics
of
the
authentication
method
MUST
be
clearly
documented.
The
Security
Considerations
section
MUST
discuss
the
policy
mechanism
by
which
DIDs
are
proven
to
be
uniquely
assigned.
Method-specific
endpoint
authentication
MUST
be
discussed.
Where
DID
methods
make
use
of
DLTs
with
varying
network
topology,
sometimes
offered
as
light
node
or
thin
client
implementations
to
reduce
required
computing
resources,
the
security
assumptions
of
the
topology
available
to
implementations
of
the
DID
method
MUST
be
discussed.
If
a
protocol
incorporates
cryptographic
protection
mechanisms,
the
DID
method
specification
MUST
clearly
indicate
which
portions
of
the
data
are
protected
and
by
what
protections,
and
it
SHOULD
give
an
indication
of
the
sorts
of
attacks
to
which
the
cryptographic
protection
is
susceptible.
Some
examples
are
integrity
only,
confidentiality,
and
endpoint
authentication.
Data
which
is
to
be
held
secret
(keying
material,
random
seeds,
and
so
on)
SHOULD
be
clearly
labeled.
DID
method
specifications
SHOULD
explain
and
specify
the
implementation
of
signatures
on
DID
documents
,
if
applicable.
Where
DID
methods
use
peer-to-peer
computing
resources,
such
as
with
all
known
DLTs
,
the
expected
burdens
of
those
resources
SHOULD
be
discussed
in
relation
to
denial
of
service.
DID
methods
that
introduce
new
authentication
service
types,
as
described
in
5.4
Services
,
SHOULD
consider
the
security
requirements
of
the
supported
authentication
protocol.
7.4
Privacy
Requirements
The
requirements
for
all
DID
method
specifications
when
authoring
the
Privacy
Considerations
section
are:
The
DID
method
specification's
Privacy
Considerations
section
MUST
discuss
any
subsection
of
Section
5
of
[
RFC6973
]
that
could
apply
in
a
method-specific
manner.
The
subsections
to
consider
are:
surveillance,
stored
data
compromise,
unsolicited
traffic,
misattribution,
correlation,
identification,
secondary
use,
disclosure,
and
exclusion.
8.
Security
Considerations
This
section
is
non-normative.
This
section
contains
a
variety
of
security
considerations
that
people
using
Decentralized
Identifiers
are
advised
to
consider
before
deploying
this
technology
in
a
production
setting.
Readers
are
urged
to
read
the
Security
Considerations
section
of
the
Controlled
Identifiers
v1.0
specification
before
reading
this
section.
DIDs
are
designed
to
operate
under
the
threat
model
used
by
many
IETF
standards
and
documented
in
[
RFC3552
].
This
section
elaborates
upon
a
number
of
the
considerations
in
[
RFC3552
],
as
well
as
other
considerations
that
are
unique
to
DID
architecture.
8.1
Choosing
DID
Resolvers
The
repository
of
DID
Extensions
[
DID-EXTENSIONS
]
contains
an
informative
list
of
DID
method
names
and
their
corresponding
DID
method
specifications.
Implementers
need
to
bear
in
mind
that
there
is
no
central
authority
to
mandate
which
DID
method
specification
is
to
be
used
with
any
specific
DID
method
name.
If
there
is
doubt
on
whether
or
not
a
specific
DID
resolver
implements
a
DID
method
correctly,
the
DID
Specification
Registries
can
be
used
to
look
up
the
registered
specification
and
make
an
informed
decision
regarding
which
DID
resolver
implementation
to
use.
The
subject
has
had
adequate
opportunity
to
revert
malicious
updates
according
to
the
authorization
mechanism
for
the
DID
method
.
8.3
Notification
of
DID
Document
Changes
One
mitigation
against
unauthorized
changes
to
a
DID
document
is
monitoring
and
actively
notifying
the
DID
subject
when
there
are
changes.
This
is
analogous
to
helping
prevent
account
takeover
on
conventional
username/password
accounts
by
sending
password
reset
notifications
to
the
email
addresses
on
file.
In
the
case
of
a
DID
,
there
is
no
intermediary
registrar
or
account
provider
to
generate
such
notifications.
However,
if
the
verifiable
data
registry
on
which
the
DID
is
registered
directly
supports
change
notifications,
a
subscription
service
can
be
offered
to
DID
controllers
.
Notifications
could
be
sent
directly
to
the
relevant
service
endpoints
listed
in
an
existing
DID
.
Trustless
systems
are
those
where
all
trust
is
derived
from
cryptographically
provable
assertions,
and
more
specifically,
where
no
metadata
outside
of
the
cryptographic
system
is
factored
into
the
determination
of
trust
in
the
system.
To
verify
a
signature
of
proof
for
a
verification
method
which
has
been
revoked
in
a
trustless
system,
a
DID
method
needs
to
support
either
or
both
of
the
versionId
or
versionTime
,
as
well
as
both
the
updated
and
nextUpdate
,
DID
document
metadata
properties.
A
verifier
can
validate
a
signature
or
proof
of
a
revoked
key
if
and
only
if
all
of
the
following
are
true:
The
proof
or
signature
includes
the
versionId
or
versionTime
of
the
DID
document
that
was
used
at
the
point
in
time
at
which
the
signature
or
proof
was
made.
The
verifier
can
determine
the
point
in
time
at
which
the
signature
or
proof
was
made;
for
example,
it
was
anchored
on
a
blockchain.
In
the
resolved
DID
document
metadata,
the
updated
timestamp
is
before,
and
the
nextUpdate
timestamp
is
after,
the
point
in
time
at
which
the
signature
or
proof
was
made.
Similar
trust
may
be
achieved
in
systems
that
are
willing
to
accept
metadata
beyond
that
which
constitutes
cryptographic
input
--
but
this
always
requires
a
careful
judgment
about
whether
a
DID
document
's
content
included
the
expected
content
at
the
moment
of
a
signing
event.
8.5
DID
Recovery
Recovery
is
a
reactive
security
measure
whereby
a
controller
that
has
lost
the
ability
to
perform
DID
operations,
such
as
through
the
loss
of
a
device,
is
able
to
regain
the
ability
to
perform
DID
operations.
The
following
considerations
might
be
of
use
when
contemplating
the
use
of
DID
recovery:
Proactively
performing
recovery,
on
an
infrequent
but
regular
basis,
can
help
to
prevent
loss
of
control.
It
is
considered
a
best
practice
to
never
reuse
cryptographic
material
associated
with
recovery
for
any
other
purposes.
Recovery
is
advised
when
a
controller
or
any
service
trusted
to
act
on
their
behalf
no
longer
has
the
exclusive
ability
to
perform
DID
operations
as
described
in
7.2
Method
Operations
.
DID
method
specifications
might
choose
to
enable
support
for
a
quorum
of
trusted
parties
to
facilitate
recovery.
Some
of
the
facilities
to
do
so
are
suggested
in
5.1.2
DID
Controller
.
Not
all
DID
method
specifications
will
recognize
control
from
DIDs
registered
using
other
DID
methods
and
they
might
restrict
third-party
control
to
DIDs
that
use
the
same
method.
Access
control
and
recovery
in
a
DID
method
specification
can
also
include
a
time
lock
feature
to
protect
against
key
compromise
by
maintaining
a
second
track
of
control
for
recovery.
There
are
currently
no
common
recovery
mechanisms
that
apply
to
all
DID
methods
.
8.6
The
Role
of
Human-Friendly
Identifiers
DIDs
achieve
global
uniqueness
without
the
need
for
a
central
registration
authority.
This
comes
at
the
cost
of
human
memorability.
Algorithms
capable
of
generating
globally
unambiguous
identifiers
produce
random
strings
of
characters
that
have
no
human
meaning.
This
trade-off
is
often
referred
to
as
Zooko's
Triangle
.
There
are
use
cases
where
it
is
desirable
to
discover
a
DID
when
starting
from
a
human-friendly
identifier.
For
example,
a
natural
language
name,
a
domain
name,
or
a
conventional
address
for
a
DID
controller
,
such
as
a
mobile
telephone
number,
email
address,
social
media
username,
or
blog
URL.
However,
the
problem
of
mapping
human-friendly
identifiers
to
DIDs
,
and
doing
so
in
a
way
that
can
be
verified
and
trusted,
is
outside
the
scope
of
this
specification.
Solutions
to
this
problem
are
defined
in
separate
specifications,
such
as
[
DNS-DID
],
that
reference
this
specification.
It
is
strongly
recommended
that
such
specifications
carefully
consider
the:
Numerous
security
attacks
based
on
deceiving
users
about
the
true
human-friendly
identifier
for
a
target
entity.
Privacy
consequences
of
using
human-friendly
identifiers
that
are
inherently
correlatable,
especially
if
they
are
globally
unique.
8.7
DIDs
as
Enhanced
URNs
If
desired
by
a
DID
controller
,
a
DID
or
a
DID
URL
is
capable
of
acting
as
persistent,
location-independent
resource
identifier.
These
sorts
of
identifiers
are
classified
as
Uniform
Resource
Names
(URNs)
and
are
defined
in
[
RFC8141
].
DIDs
are
an
enhanced
form
of
URN
that
provide
a
cryptographically
secure,
location-independent
identifier
for
a
digital
resource,
while
also
providing
metadata
that
enables
retrieval.
Due
to
the
indirection
between
the
DID
document
and
the
DID
itself,
the
DID
controller
can
adjust
the
actual
location
of
the
resource
—
or
even
provide
the
resource
directly
—
without
adjusting
the
DID
.
DIDs
of
this
type
can
definitively
verify
that
the
resource
retrieved
is,
in
fact,
the
resource
identified.
A
DID
controller
who
intends
to
use
a
DID
for
this
purpose
is
advised
to
follow
the
security
considerations
in
[
RFC8141
].
In
particular:
The
DID
controller
is
expected
to
choose
a
DID
method
that
supports
the
controller's
requirements
for
persistence.
The
Decentralized
Characteristics
Rubric
[
DID-RUBRIC
]
is
one
tool
available
to
help
implementers
decide
upon
the
most
suitable
DID
method
.
The
DID
controller
is
expected
to
publish
its
operational
policies
so
requesting
parties
can
determine
the
degree
to
which
they
can
rely
on
the
persistence
of
a
DID
controlled
by
that
DID
controller
.
In
the
absence
of
such
policies,
requesting
parties
are
not
expected
to
make
any
assumption
about
whether
a
DID
is
a
persistent
identifier
for
the
same
DID
subject
.
8.8
Immutability
Many
cybersecurity
abuses
hinge
on
exploiting
gaps
between
reality
and
the
assumptions
of
rational,
good-faith
actors.
Immutability
of
DID
documents
can
provide
some
security
benefits.
Individual
DID
methods
ought
to
consider
constraints
that
would
eliminate
behaviors
or
semantics
they
do
not
need.
The
more
locked
down
a
DID
method
is,
while
providing
the
same
set
of
features,
the
less
it
can
be
manipulated
by
malicious
actors.
As
an
example,
consider
that
a
single
edit
to
a
DID
document
can
change
anything
except
the
root
id
property
of
the
document.
But
is
it
actually
desirable
for
a
service
to
change
its
type
after
it
is
defined?
Or
for
a
key
to
change
its
value?
Or
would
it
be
better
to
require
a
new
id
when
certain
fundamental
properties
of
an
object
change?
Malicious
takeovers
of
a
website
often
aim
for
an
outcome
where
the
site
keeps
its
host
name
identifier,
but
is
subtly
changed
underneath.
If
certain
properties
of
the
site,
such
as
the
ASN
associated
with
its
IP
address,
were
required
by
the
specification
to
be
immutable,
anomaly
detection
would
be
easier,
and
attacks
would
be
much
harder
and
more
expensive
to
carry
out.
For
DID
methods
tied
to
a
global
source
of
truth,
a
direct,
just-in-time
lookup
of
the
latest
version
of
a
DID
document
is
always
possible.
However,
it
seems
likely
that
layers
of
cache
might
eventually
sit
between
a
DID
resolver
and
that
source
of
truth.
If
they
do,
believing
the
attributes
of
an
object
in
the
DID
document
to
have
a
given
state
when
they
are
actually
subtly
different
might
invite
exploits.
This
is
particularly
true
if
some
lookups
are
of
a
full
DID
document
,
and
others
are
of
partial
data
where
the
larger
context
is
assumed.
8.9
Encrypted
Data
in
DID
Documents
Encryption
algorithms
have
been
known
to
fail
due
to
advances
in
cryptography
and
computing
power.
Implementers
are
advised
to
assume
that
any
encrypted
data
placed
in
a
DID
document
might
eventually
be
made
available
in
clear
text
to
the
same
audience
to
which
the
encrypted
data
is
available.
This
is
particularly
pertinent
if
the
DID
document
is
public.
Encrypting
all
or
parts
of
a
DID
document
is
not
an
appropriate
means
to
protect
data
in
the
long
term.
Similarly,
placing
encrypted
data
in
a
DID
document
is
not
an
appropriate
means
to
protect
personal
data.
Given
the
caveats
above,
if
encrypted
data
is
included
in
a
DID
document
,
implementers
are
advised
to
not
associate
any
correlatable
information
that
could
be
used
to
infer
a
relationship
between
the
encrypted
data
and
an
associated
party.
Examples
of
correlatable
information
include
public
keys
of
a
receiving
party,
identifiers
to
digital
assets
known
to
be
under
the
control
of
a
receiving
party,
or
human
readable
descriptions
of
a
receiving
party.
8.10
Equivalence
Properties
Given
the
equivalentId
and
canonicalId
properties
are
generated
by
DID
methods
themselves,
the
same
security
and
accuracy
guarantees
that
apply
to
the
resolved
DID
present
in
the
id
field
of
a
DID
document
also
apply
to
these
properties.
The
alsoKnownAs
property
is
not
guaranteed
to
be
an
accurate
statement
of
equivalence,
and
should
not
be
relied
upon
without
performing
validation
steps
beyond
the
resolution
of
the
DID
document
.
The
equivalentId
and
canonicalId
properties
express
equivalence
assertions
to
variants
of
a
single
DID
produced
by
the
same
DID
method
and
can
be
trusted
to
the
extent
the
requesting
party
trusts
the
DID
method
and
a
conforming
producer
and
resolver.
As
with
any
other
security-related
properties
in
the
DID
document
,
parties
relying
on
any
equivalence
statement
in
a
DID
document
should
guard
against
the
values
of
these
properties
being
substituted
by
an
attacker
after
the
proper
verification
has
been
performed.
Any
write
access
to
a
DID
document
stored
in
memory
or
disk
after
verification
has
been
performed
is
an
attack
vector
that
might
circumvent
verification
unless
the
DID
document
is
re-verified.
8.11
Persistence
DIDs
are
designed
to
be
persistent
such
that
a
controller
need
not
rely
upon
a
single
trusted
third
party
or
administrator
to
maintain
their
identifiers.
In
an
ideal
case,
no
administrator
can
take
control
away
from
the
controller
,
nor
can
an
administrator
prevent
their
identifiers'
use
for
any
particular
purpose
such
as
authentication,
authorization,
and
attestation.
No
third
party
can
act
on
behalf
of
a
controller
to
remove
or
render
inoperable
an
entity's
identifier
without
the
controller
's
consent.
However,
it
is
important
to
note
that
in
all
DID
methods
that
enable
cryptographic
proof-of-control,
the
means
of
proving
control
can
always
be
transferred
to
another
party
by
transferring
the
secret
cryptographic
material.
Therefore,
it
is
vital
that
systems
relying
on
the
persistence
of
an
identifier
over
time
regularly
check
to
ensure
that
the
identifier
is,
in
fact,
still
under
the
control
of
the
intended
party.
Unfortunately,
it
is
impossible
to
determine
from
the
cryptography
alone
whether
or
not
the
secret
cryptographic
material
associated
with
a
given
verification
method
has
been
compromised.
It
might
well
be
that
the
expected
controller
still
has
access
to
the
secret
cryptographic
material
—
and
as
such
can
execute
a
proof-of-control
as
part
of
a
verification
process
—
while
at
the
same
time,
a
bad
actor
also
has
access
to
those
same
keys,
or
to
a
copy
thereof.
As
such,
cryptographic
proof-of-control
is
expected
to
only
be
used
as
one
factor
in
evaluating
the
level
of
identity
assurance
required
for
high-stakes
scenarios.
DID
-based
authentication
provides
much
greater
assurance
than
a
username
and
password,
thanks
to
the
ability
to
determine
control
over
a
cryptographic
secret
without
transmitting
that
secret
between
systems.
However,
it
is
not
infallible.
Scenarios
that
involve
sensitive,
high
value,
or
life-critical
operations
are
expected
to
use
additional
factors
as
appropriate.
In
addition
to
potential
ambiguity
from
use
by
different
controllers
,
it
is
impossible
to
guarantee,
in
general,
that
a
given
DID
is
being
used
in
reference
to
the
same
subject
at
any
given
point
in
time.
It
is
technically
possible
for
the
controller
to
reuse
a
DID
for
different
subjects
and,
more
subtly,
for
the
precise
definition
of
the
subject
to
either
change
over
time
or
be
misunderstood.
For
example,
consider
a
DID
used
for
a
sole
proprietorship,
receiving
various
credentials
used
for
financial
transactions.
To
the
controller
,
that
identifier
referred
to
the
business.
As
the
business
grows,
it
eventually
gets
incorporated
as
a
Limited
Liability
Company.
The
controller
continues
using
that
same
DID
,
because
to
them
the
DID
refers
to
the
business.
However,
to
the
state,
the
tax
authority,
and
the
local
municipality,
the
DID
no
longer
refers
to
the
same
entity.
Whether
or
not
the
subtle
shift
in
meaning
matters
to
a
credit
provider
or
supplier
is
necessarily
up
to
them
to
decide.
In
many
cases,
as
long
as
the
bills
get
paid
and
collections
can
be
enforced,
the
shift
is
immaterial.
Due
to
these
potential
ambiguities,
DIDs
are
to
be
considered
valid
contextually
rather
than
absolutely.
Their
persistence
does
not
imply
that
they
refer
to
the
exact
same
subject,
nor
that
they
are
under
the
control
of
the
same
controller
.
Instead,
one
needs
to
understand
the
context
in
which
the
DID
was
created,
how
it
is
used,
and
consider
the
likely
shifts
in
their
meaning,
and
adopt
procedures
and
policies
to
address
both
potential
and
inevitable
semantic
drift.
8.12
Evaluating
Competing
Considerations
This
section
is
non-normative.
This
specification
does
not
require
or
suggest
the
use
of
any
specific
type
of
verifiable
data
registry
.
Different
use
cases
might
result
in
different
requirements.
Different
requirements
might
suggest
different
considerations
with
different
trade-offs.
For
example,
trade-offs
between
computation
(energy
usage),
trust
(deference
to
authority),
coordination
(network
bandwidth),
or
memory
(physical
storage)
might
or
might
not
be
appropriate
for
any
given
use
case.
Other
use
cases
might
not
make
the
same
trade-offs.
Those
that
need
to
consider
different
criteria
for
their
use
case
are
directed
to
the
DID
Method
Rubric
,
which
provides
evaluation
criteria
to
help
decision
makers
determine
whether
or
not
a
particular
DID
Method
is
appropriate
for
their
use
cases.
9.
Privacy
Considerations
This
section
is
non-normative.
Since
DIDs
and
DID
documents
are
designed
to
be
administered
directly
by
the
DID
controller(s)
,
it
is
critically
important
to
apply
the
principles
of
Privacy
by
Design
[
PRIVACY-BY-DESIGN
]
to
all
aspects
of
the
decentralized
identifier
architecture.
All
seven
of
these
principles
have
been
applied
throughout
the
development
of
this
specification.
The
design
used
in
this
specification
does
not
assume
that
there
is
a
registrar,
hosting
company,
nor
other
intermediate
service
provider
to
recommend
or
apply
additional
privacy
safeguards.
Privacy
in
this
specification
is
preventive,
not
remedial,
and
is
an
embedded
default.
Before
reading
this
section,
readers
are
urged
to
read
the
Privacy
Considerations
section
of
the
Controlled
Identifiers
v1.0
specification,
as
it
contains
more
general
privacy
considerations
that
also
apply
to
DIDs
.
The
rest
of
this
section
covers
privacy
considerations
that
are
specific
to
decentralized
identifiers
and
are
in
addition
to
the
guidance
provided
in
the
Controlled
Identifiers
v1.0
specification.
9.1
Group
Privacy
When
a
DID
subject
is
indistinguishable
from
others
in
the
group,
privacy
is
available.
When
the
act
of
engaging
privately
with
another
party
is
by
itself
a
recognizable
flag,
privacy
is
greatly
diminished.
DIDs
and
DID
methods
need
to
work
to
improve
group
privacy,
particularly
for
those
who
legitimately
need
it
most.
Choose
technologies
and
human
interfaces
that
default
to
preserving
anonymity
and
pseudonymity.
To
reduce
digital
fingerprints
,
share
common
settings
across
requesting
party
implementations,
keep
negotiated
options
to
a
minimum
on
wire
protocols,
use
encrypted
transport
layers,
and
pad
messages
to
standard
lengths.
Example
15
:
DID
Document
that
uses
relative
DID
URLs
{"@context":"https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1.1","id":"did:example:123","verificationMethod":[{// A relative DID URL, that will be transformed to the absolute DID URL value did:example:123#key-1"id":"#key-1","type":"Ed25519VerificationKey2020","controller":"did:example:123","publicKeyMultibase":"z6MkmM42vxfqZQsv4ehtTjFFxQ4sQKS2w6WR7emozFAn5cxu"}],"authentication":["#key-1"],"capabilityInvocation":["#key-1"],"capabilityDelegation":["#key-1"],"assertionMethod":[// Using relative DID URL #key-1 is equivalent to using the absolute DID URL value did:example:123#key-1"did:example:123#key-1"]
}
Example
16
:
Verifiable
Credential
linked
to
a
verification
method
of
type
Multikey
{// external (all terms in this example)"@context":["https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2","https://w3id.org/citizenship/v4rc1"],"type":["VerifiableCredential","PermanentResidentCardCredential"],"issuer":{"id":"did:key:zDnaeYGXycLmAn5m9akGtdL6rqBspGQPM7QZXW2CvJ3k9c2Bz","image":"...5CYII="},"name":"Permanent Resident Card","description":"Government of Utopia Permanent Resident Card.","credentialSubject":{"type":["PermanentResident","Person"],"givenName":"JANE","familyName":"SMITH","gender":"Female","image":"...kJggg==","residentSince":"2015-01-01","commuterClassification":"C1","birthCountry":"Arcadia","birthDate":"1978-07-17","permanentResidentCard":{"type":"PermanentResidentCard","identifier":"83627465","lprCategory":"C09","lprNumber":"999-999-999"}},"validFrom":"2025-01-04T00:00:00Z","validUntil":"2026-01-04T23:59:59Z","proof":{"type":"DataIntegrityProof","created":"2025-01-04T15:02:36Z","verificationMethod":"did:key:zDnaeYGXycLmAn5m9akGtdL6rqBspGQPM7QZXW2CvJ3k9c2Bz#zDnaeYGXycLmAn5m9akGtdL6rqBspGQPM7QZXW2CvJ3k9c2Bz","cryptosuite":"ecdsa-rdfc-2019","proofPurpose":"assertionMethod","proofValue":"z5CK4DPN7...Jpqwp"}
}
Example
17
:
Verifiable
Credential
linked
to
a
verification
method
of
type
JsonWebKey
{// external (all terms in this example)"@context":["https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2","https://w3id.org/citizenship/v4rc1"],"type":["VerifiableCredential","PermanentResidentCardCredential"],"issuer":{"id":"did:example:123#key-1","image":"...5CYII="},"name":"Permanent Resident Card","description":"Government of Utopia Permanent Resident Card.","credentialSubject":{"type":["PermanentResident","Person"],"givenName":"JANE","familyName":"SMITH","gender":"Female","image":"...kJggg==","residentSince":"2015-01-01","commuterClassification":"C1","birthCountry":"Arcadia","birthDate":"1978-07-17","permanentResidentCard":{"type":"PermanentResidentCard","identifier":"83627465","lprCategory":"C09","lprNumber":"999-999-999"}},"validFrom":"2025-01-04T00:00:00Z","validUntil":"2026-01-04T23:59:59Z","proof":{"type":"DataIntegrityProof","created":"2025-01-04T15:02:36Z","verificationMethod":"did:example:123#key-1","cryptosuite":"ecdsa-jcs-2019","proofPurpose":"assertionMethod","proofValue":"z5m9akGtdL...6rqBspGQP"}
}
Example
18
:
Verifiable
Credential
linked
to
a
bls12381
verification
method
{// external (all terms in this example)"@context":["https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2","https://w3id.org/citizenship/v4rc1"],"type":["VerifiableCredential","PermanentResidentCardCredential"],"issuer":{"id":"did:key:zUC7DojAAkoD8WpSS87KG6iuMSBd4wH1fZzmcwmakx4JfaXN7RLSES4wNCfWboHvULxGxRwiSsj6UYSgq1dWGusdwrrJsjUQQEb1oid3igF4hbSFzFjf9aWTJSphhu63vHGoAVE","image":"...CYII="},"name":"Permanent Resident Card","description":"Government of Utopia Permanent Resident Card.","credentialSubject":{"type":["PermanentResident","Person"],"givenName":"JANE","familyName":"SMITH","gender":"Female","image":"...3dgg==","residentSince":"2015-01-01","commuterClassification":"C1","birthCountry":"Arcadia","birthDate":"1978-07-17","permanentResidentCard":{"type":"PermanentResidentCard","identifier":"83627465","lprCategory":"C09","lprNumber":"999-999-999"}},"validFrom":"2025-01-04T00:00:00Z","validUntil":"2026-01-04T23:59:59Z","proof":{"type":"DataIntegrityProof","verificationMethod":"did:key:zUC7DojAAkoD8WpSS87KG6iuMSBd4wH1fZzmcwmakx4JfaXN7RLSES4wNCfWboHvULxGxRwiSsj6UYSgq1dWGusdwrrJsjUQQEb1oid3igF4hbSFzFjf9aWTJSphhu63vHGoAVE#zUC7DojAAkoD8WpSS87KG6iuMSBd4wH1fZzmcwmakx4JfaXN7RLSES4wNCfWboHvULxGxRwiSsj6UYSgq1dWGusdwrrJsjUQQEb1oid3igF4hbSFzFjf9aWTJSphhu63vHGoAVE","cryptosuite":"bbs-2023","proofPurpose":"assertionMethod","proofValue":"u2V0ChVhQik2d4...pc3N1ZXI"}
}
Example
19
:
Verifiable
Credential
selective
disclosure
zero
knowledge
proof
linked
to
a
bls12381
verification
method
{// external (all terms in this example)"@context":"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2","type":"VerifiablePresentation",// holder did:key is pairwise to the domain to avoid correlation"holder":"did:key:z6MkveKdpgkQ1pwNktQ5Lc19epBrzFjMUeNMUZGFvezFF2dX","verifiableCredential":{"@context":["https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2","https://w3id.org/citizenship/v4rc1"],"type":["VerifiableCredential","PermanentResidentCardCredential"],"issuer":{"id":"did:web:unlinkable.example","image":"...CYII="},"credentialSubject":{"type":["PermanentResident","Person"],// only country is selectively disclosed"birthCountry":"Arcadia"},"proof":{"type":"DataIntegrityProof","verificationMethod":"did:web:vcplayground.org#zUC7EwMqo9vCjFmj7ArU2SivcbeccAY6hd4nw5fVD6xD4W2vm9eVy6VqVnciAZRmPLXnuxuka5JTJVmgz66CxDno6eqZmvUViCckCcKg8A4s1R4i2JjyzrdTQs5zrfY4jJCHFCp","cryptosuite":"bbs-2023","proofPurpose":"assertionMethod","proofValue":"u2V0DhV...3JnIn0"}},"proof":{"type":"DataIntegrityProof","created":"2025-01-04T15:10:39Z","verificationMethod":"did:key:z6MkveKdpgkQ1pwNktQ5Lc19epBrzFjMUeNMUZGFvezFF2dX#z6MkveKdpgkQ1pwNktQ5Lc19epBrzFjMUeNMUZGFvezFF2dX","proofPurpose":"authentication","challenge":"QZVVFcXlMPStFmpXTSktv","domain":"https://unlinkable.example","proofValue":"z5tXmHk...x2GvTt3bF"}
}
{// external (all terms in this example)"protected":{"kid":"did:example:123#_Qq0UL2Fq651Q0Fjd6TvnYE-faHiOpRlPVQcY_-tA4A","alg":"EdDSA"},"payload":{"@context":["https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2","https://w3id.org/citizenship/v4rc1"],"type":["VerifiableCredential","PermanentResidentCardCredential"],"issuer":{"id":"did:key:zUC7Do...oAVE","image":"...CYII="},"name":"Permanent Resident Card","description":"Government of Utopia Permanent Resident Card.","credentialSubject":{"type":["PermanentResident","Person"],"givenName":"JANE","familyName":"SMITH","gender":"Female","image":"...3dgg==","residentSince":"2015-01-01","commuterClassification":"C1","birthCountry":"Arcadia","birthDate":"1978-07-17","permanentResidentCard":{"type":"PermanentResidentCard","identifier":"83627465","lprCategory":"C09","lprNumber":"999-999-999"}},"validFrom":"2025-01-04T00:00:00Z","validUntil":"2026-01-04T23:59:59Z",},"signature":"qSv6d...bJRAw"
}
A.3
Encrypting
This
section
is
non-normative.
Note
These
examples
are
for
information
purposes
only,
it
is
considered
a
best
practice
to
avoid
dislosing
unnecessary
information
in
JWE
headers.
Example
21
:
JWE
linked
to
a
verification
method
via
kid
{// external (all terms in this example)"ciphertext":"3SHQQJajNH6q0fyAHmw...","iv":"QldSPLVnFf2-VXcNLza6mbylYwphW57Q","protected":"eyJlbmMiOiJYQzIwUCJ9","recipients":[{"encrypted_key":"BMJ19zK12YHftJ4sr6Pz1rX1HtYni_L9DZvO1cEZfRWDN2vXeOYlwA","header":{"alg":"ECDH-ES+A256KW","apu":"Tx9qG69ZfodhRos-8qfhTPc6ZFnNUcgNDVdHqX1UR3s","apv":"ZGlkOmVsZW06cm9wc3RlbjpFa...","epk":{"crv":"X25519","kty":"OKP","x":"Tx9qG69ZfodhRos-8qfhTPc6ZFnNUcgNDVdHqX1UR3s"},"kid":"did:example:123#zC1Rnuvw9rVa6E5TKF4uQVRuQuaCpVgB81Um2u17Fu7UK"}}],"tag":"xbfwwDkzOAJfSVem0jr1bA"
}
A
DID
is
a
specific
type
of
URI
(Uniform
Resource
Identifier),
so
a
DID
can
refer
to
any
resource.
Per
[
RFC3986
]:
the
term
"resource"
is
used
in
a
general
sense
for
whatever
might
be
identified
by
a
URI.
[...]
A
resource
is
not
necessarily
accessible
via
the
Internet.
Resources
can
be
digital
or
physical,
abstract
or
concrete.
Any
resource
that
can
be
assigned
a
URI
can
be
assigned
a
DID
.
The
resource
referred
to
by
the
DID
is
the
DID
subject
.
The
DID
controller
determines
the
DID
subject
.
It
is
not
expected
to
be
possible
to
determine
the
DID
subject
from
looking
at
the
DID
itself,
as
DIDs
are
generally
only
meaningful
to
machines,
not
human.
A
DID
is
unlikely
to
contain
any
information
about
the
DID
subject
,
so
further
information
about
the
DID
subject
is
only
discoverable
by
resolving
the
DID
to
the
DID
document
,
obtaining
a
verifiable
credential
about
the
DID
,
or
via
some
other
description
of
the
DID
.
While
the
value
of
the
id
property
in
the
retrieved
DID
document
must
always
match
the
DID
being
resolved,
whether
or
not
the
actual
resource
to
which
the
DID
refers
can
change
over
time
is
dependent
upon
the
DID
method
.
For
example,
a
DID
method
that
permits
the
DID
subject
to
change
could
be
used
to
generate
a
DID
for
the
current
occupant
of
a
particular
role—such
as
the
CEO
of
a
company—where
the
actual
person
occupying
the
role
can
be
different
depending
on
when
the
DID
is
resolved.
Two
filled
black
circles
appear
at
the
top
of
the
diagram,
one
on
the
left,
labeled
"DID
Controller",
and
one
on
the
right,
labeled
"DID
Subject".
A
rectangle,
with
lower
right
corner
bent
inwards
to
form
a
small
triangle,
appears
below,
containing
the
label
"DID
Document".
Arrows
extend
between
these
three
items,
as
follows.
A
solid
red
arrow
points
directly
from
the
DID
Controller
circle,
rightwards
to
the
DID
Subject
circle,
labeled
"DID"
above
it
in
large
font,
and
"Identifies"
below
it
in
small
italic
font.
The
other
arrow
labels
are
also
in
small
italic
font.
A
dotted
red
arrow,
labeled
"Resolves
to",
extends
from
DID
Controller,
starting
in
the
same
line
as
the
first
arrow,
then
curving
downward
to
point
to
the
DID
Document
rectangle.
A
green
arrow,
labeled
"Controls",
points
directly
from
DID
Controller
to
DID
Document.
A
green
arrow
labeled
"Controller"
points
in
the
opposite
direction,
from
DID
Document
to
DID
Controller,
making
an
arc
outward
to
the
left
of
the
diagram.
A
blue
arrow,
labeled,
"Describes"
points
directly
from
DID
Document
to
DID
Subject.
B.6
Discovering
more
information
about
the
DID
subject
This
section
is
non-normative.
Options
for
discovering
more
information
about
the
DID
subject
depend
on
the
properties
present
in
the
DID
document
.
If
the
service
property
is
present,
more
information
can
be
requested
from
a
service
endpoint
.
For
example,
by
querying
a
service
endpoint
that
supports
verifiable
credentials
for
one
or
more
claims
(attributes)
describing
the
DID
subject
.
Another
option
is
to
use
the
alsoKnownAs
property
if
it
is
present
in
the
DID
document
.
The
DID
controller
can
use
it
to
provide
a
list
of
other
URIs
(including
other
DIDs
)
that
refer
to
the
same
DID
subject
.
Resolving
or
dereferencing
these
URIs
might
yield
other
descriptions
or
representations
of
the
DID
subject
as
illustrated
in
the
figure
below.
The
diagram
contains
three
small
black
filled
circles,
two
rectangles
with
bent
corners,
arrows
between
them,
and
labels,
as
follows.
On
the
upper
left
is
a
circle
labeled
"DID
Controller".
On
the
upper
right
is
a
circle
labeled
"DID
Subject".
On
the
lower-middle
right
is
a
circle
without
a
label.
On
the
lower
right
is
a
rectangle
labeled
"Description".
In
the
center
of
the
diagram
is
a
rectangle
labeled
"DID
Document".
Inside
the
DID
Document
rectangle,
beneath
its
label,
is
two
lines
of
code:
"alsoKnownAs:
[",
and
"URI]".
A
black
arrow
extends
from
the
second
line,
to
the
right,
crossing
the
rectangle
border,
pointing
to
the
unlabeled
circle
at
the
right
of
the
diagram.
This
arrow
is
labeled
above
it
in
large
font,
"URI",
and
below
it
in
italic,
"Identifies".
A
black
arrow
points
from
the
unlabeled
circle
downwards
to
the
Description
rectangle,
labeled
"Dereferences
to".
A
blue
arrow,
labeled
"Describes",
extends
from
Description,
arcing
on
the
right,
pointing
up
to
DID
Subject.
A
blue
arrow,
also
labeled
"Describes",
points
directly
from
the
rectangle,
labeled
"DID
Document",
in
the
center
of
the
diagram,
up
and
to
the
right
to
the
DID
Subject
circle.
A
red
arrow,
labeled
"alsoKnownAs",
points
from
DID
Subject
down
to
the
unlabeled
circle.
A
red
arrow,
labeled
"DID"
above
it
in
large
font,
and
"Identifies"
below
it
in
italic
font,
lies
at
the
top
of
the
image,
pointing
from
DID
Controller
to
DID
Subject.
A
dotted
red
line
starts
in
the
same
place
but
branches
off
and
curves
downward
to
point
to
the
DID
Document
rectangle
at
the
center
of
the
image.
A
green
arrow,
labeled
"Controls",
points
directly
from
DID
Controller
to
DID
Document.
Another
green
arrow
points
in
the
opposite
direction,
labeled
"Controller",
curving
outwards
on
the
left
of
the
image,
from
DID
Document
to
DID
Controller.
B.7
Serving
a
representation
of
the
DID
subject
This
section
is
non-normative.
If
the
DID
subject
is
a
digital
resource
that
can
be
retrieved
from
the
internet,
a
DID
method
can
choose
to
construct
a
DID
URL
which
returns
a
representation
of
the
DID
subject
itself.
For
example,
a
data
schema
that
needs
a
persistent,
cryptographically
verifiable
identifier
could
be
assigned
a
DID
,
and
passing
a
specified
Path
or
Query
could
be
used
as
a
standard
way
to
retrieve
a
representation
of
that
schema.
Similarly,
a
DID
can
be
used
to
refer
to
a
digital
resource
(such
as
an
image)
that
can
be
returned
directly
from
a
verifiable
data
registry
if
that
functionality
is
supported
by
the
applicable
DID
method
.
B.8
Assigning
DIDs
to
existing
web
resources
This
section
is
non-normative.
If
the
controller
of
a
web
page
or
any
other
web
resource
wants
to
assign
it
a
persistent,
cryptographically
verifiable
identifier,
the
controller
can
give
it
a
DID
.
For
example,
the
author
of
a
blog
hosted
by
a
blog
hosting
company
(under
that
hosting
company's
domain)
could
create
a
DID
for
the
blog.
In
the
DID
document
,
the
author
can
include
the
alsoKnownAs
property
pointing
to
the
current
URL
of
the
blog,
e.g.:
If
the
author
subsequently
moves
the
blog
to
a
different
hosting
company
(or
to
the
author's
own
domain),
the
author
can
update
the
DID
document
to
point
to
the
new
URL
for
the
blog,
e.g.:
"alsoKnownAs":
["https://myblog.example/"]
The
DID
effectively
adds
a
layer
of
indirection
for
the
blog
URL.
This
layer
of
indirection
is
under
the
control
of
the
author
instead
of
under
the
control
of
an
external
administrative
authority
such
as
the
blog
hosting
company.
This
is
how
a
DID
can
effectively
function
as
an
enhanced
URN
(Uniform
Resource
Name)
—a
persistent
identifier
for
an
information
resource
whose
network
location
might
change
over
time.
B.9
The
relationship
between
DID
controllers
and
DID
subjects
This
section
is
non-normative.
To
avoid
confusion,
it
is
helpful
to
classify
DID
subject
s
into
two
disjoint
sets
based
on
their
relationship
to
the
DID
controller
.
B.9.1
Set
#1:
The
DID
subject
is
the
DID
controller
This
section
is
non-normative.
The
first
case,
shown
in
Figure
7
,
is
the
common
scenario
where
the
DID
subject
is
also
the
DID
controller
.
This
is
the
case
when
an
individual
or
organization
creates
a
DID
to
self-identify.
Two
small
black
circles
appear
in
the
diagram,
one
on
the
upper
left,
labeled,
"DID
Controller",
and
one
on
the
upper
right,
labeled
"DID
Subject".
A
solid
red
arrow
extends
from
the
DID
Controller
circle
to
the
DID
Subject
circle,
labeled
"DID"
in
large
bold
text
above
the
arrow,
and
"Identifies"
in
small
italic
text
beneath
the
arrow.
A
dotted
red
double-ended
arrow,
labeled
"Equivalence",
extends
between
the
two
circles,
forming
an
arc
in
the
space
between
and
above
them.
In
the
lower
part
of
the
diagram
is
a
rectangle
with
bent
corner,
outlined
in
black,
containing
the
label
"DID
Document".
Arrows
point
between
this
DID
Document
rectangle
and
the
small
black
circles
for
DID
Controller
and
DID
Subject,
with
italic
labels,
as
follows.
A
blue
arrow
points
from
the
DID
Document
to
the
DID
Subject,
labeled,
"Describes".
A
green
arrow
points
from
the
DID
Controller
to
the
DID
Document,
labeled
"Controls".
A
green
arrow
points
from
the
DID
Document
to
the
DID
Controller,
in
an
outward
arc,
labeled,
"Controller".
A
dotted
red
arrow,
labeled
"Resolves
to",
extends
from
the
DID
controller
starting
to
the
right,
branching
off
from
the
arrow
to
the
DID
Subject,
then
curving
downward
to
point
to
the
DID
Document.
From
a
graph
model
perspective,
even
though
the
nodes
identified
as
the
DID
controller
and
DID
subject
in
Figure
7
are
distinct,
there
is
a
logical
arc
connecting
them
to
express
a
semantic
equivalence
relationship.
B.9.2
Set
#2:
The
DID
subject
is
not
the
DID
controller
This
section
is
non-normative.
The
second
case
is
when
the
DID
subject
is
a
separate
entity
from
the
DID
controller
.
This
is
the
case
when,
for
example,
a
parent
creates
and
maintains
control
of
a
DID
for
a
child;
a
corporation
creates
and
maintains
control
of
a
DID
for
a
subsidiary;
or
a
manufacturer
creates
and
maintains
control
of
a
DID
for
a
product,
an
IoT
device,
or
a
digital
file.
From
a
graph
model
perspective,
the
only
difference
from
Set
1
that
there
is
no
equivalence
arc
relationship
between
the
DID
subject
and
DID
controller
nodes.
In
this
case,
each
of
the
DID
controllers
might
act
on
its
own,
i.e.,
each
one
has
full
power
to
update
the
DID
document
independently.
From
a
graph
model
perspective,
in
this
configuration:
Each
additional
DID
controller
is
another
distinct
graph
node
(which
might
be
identified
by
its
own
DID
).
Three
black
circles
appear
on
the
left,
vertically,
each
labeled
"DID
Controller".
From
each
of
these
circles,
a
pair
of
green
arrows
extends
towards
the
center
of
the
diagram,
to
a
single
rectangle,
labeled
"DID
Document".
The
rectangle
has
the
lower
right
corner
cut
and
bent
inward
to
form
a
small
triangle,
as
if
to
represent
a
physical
piece
of
paper
with
curled
corner.
Each
pair
of
green
arrows
consists
of
one
arrow
pointing
from
the
black
circle
to
the
rectangle,
labeled
"Controls",
and
one
pointing
in
the
opposite
direction,
from
the
rectangle
to
the
black
circle,
labeled
"Controller".
From
the
right
of
the
rectangle
extends
a
blue
arrow,
labeled,
"Describes",
pointing
to
a
black
circle
labeled,
"DID
Subject".
B.10.2
Group
Control
This
section
is
non-normative.
In
the
case
of
group
control,
the
DID
controllers
are
expected
to
act
together
in
some
fashion,
such
as
when
using
a
cryptographic
algorithm
that
requires
multiple
digital
signatures
("multi-sig")
or
a
threshold
number
of
digital
signatures
("m-of-n").
These
additional
thresholds
for
verifying
a
proof
can
be
expressed
in
a
verification
method
as
described
in
Section
5.2
Verification
Methods
or
can
be
an
intrinsic
part
of
the
verification
material
of
the
verification
method
,
where
the
number
of
DID
controllers
that
participated
in
the
generation
of
a
particular
digital
signature
are
hidden
for
privacy
reasons.
Verification
methods
that
require
a
proof
be
produced
by
a
combination
of
cryptographic
operations
performed
by
members
of
a
group
can
be
used
to
control
the
contents
of
a
DID
document;
exactly
how
this
is
realized
depends
on
individual
DID
method
specifications.
From
a
functional
standpoint,
this
option
is
similar
to
a
single
DID
controller
because,
although
each
of
the
DID
controllers
in
the
DID
controller
group
has
its
own
graph
node,
the
actual
control
collapses
into
a
single
logical
graph
node
representing
the
DID
controller
group
as
shown
in
Figure
9
.
On
the
left
are
three
black
filled
circles,
labeled
"DID
Controller
Group"
by
a
brace
on
the
left.
From
each
of
these
three
circles,
a
green
arrow
extends
to
the
center
right.
These
three
arrows
converge
towards
a
single
filled
white
circle.
A
pair
of
horizontal
green
arrows
connects
this
white
circle
on
its
right
to
a
rectangle
shaped
like
a
page
with
a
curled
corner,
labeled
"DID
Document".
The
upper
arrow
points
right,
from
the
white
circle
to
the
rectangle,
and
is
labeled
"Controls".
The
lower
arrow
points
left,
from
the
rectangle
to
the
white
circle,
and
is
labeled
"Controller".
From
the
right
of
the
rectangle
extends
a
blue
arrow,
labeled
"Describes",
pointing
to
a
black
circle,
labeled
"DID
Subject".
This
configuration
will
often
apply
when
the
DID
subject
is
an
organization,
corporation,
government
agency,
community,
or
other
group
that
is
not
controlled
by
a
single
individual.
However,
it
is
possible
that
the
resource
identified
by
the
DID
,
the
DID
subject
,
may
change
over
time.
This
is
under
the
exclusive
authority
of
the
DID
controller
.
For
more
details,
see
section
8.11
Persistence
.
B.12
Changing
the
DID
controller
This
section
is
non-normative.
The
DID
controller
for
a
DID
document
might
change
over
time.
However,
depending
on
how
it
is
implemented,
a
change
in
the
DID
controller
might
not
be
made
apparent
by
changes
to
the
DID
document
itself.
For
example,
if
the
change
is
implemented
through
a
shift
in
ownership
of
the
underlying
cryptographic
keys
or
other
controls
used
for
one
or
more
of
the
verification
methods
in
the
DID
document
,
it
might
be
indistinguishable
from
a
standard
key
rotation.
On
the
other
hand,
if
the
change
is
implemented
by
changing
the
value
of
the
controller
property,
it
will
be
transparent.
Addition
of
at
risk
markers
to
most
of
the
DID
Parameters,
the
data
model
datatypes
that
are
expected
to
not
be
implemented,
and
the
application/did
media
type.
This
change
resulted
in
the
DID
WG's
decision
to
perform
a
second
Candidate
Recommendation
phase.
All
other
changes
were
either
editorial
or
predicted
in
"at
risk"
issue
markers.
Removal
of
the
at
risk
issue
marker
for
the
method-specific-id
ABNF
rule
and
for
nextUpdate
and
nextVersionId
.
Clarification
that
equivalentId
and
canonicalId
are
optional.
Addition
of
a
definitions
for
"amplification
attack"
and
"cryptographic
suite".
Replacement
of
publicKeyBase58
with
publicKeyMultibase
.
Updates
to
the
DID
Document
examples
section.
A
large
number
of
editorial
clean
ups
to
the
Security
Considerations
section.
The
introduction
of
an
abstract
data
model
that
can
be
serialized
to
multiple
representations
including
JSON
and
JSON-LD.
The
introduction
of
a
repository
of
DID
Extensions
for
the
purposes
of
registering
extension
properties,
representations,
DID
Resolution
input
metadata
and
output
metadata,
DID
Document
metadata,
DID
parameters,
and
DID
Methods.
Separation
of
DID
Document
metadata,
such
as
created
and
updated
values,
from
DID
Document
properties.
The
removal
of
embedded
proofs
in
the
DID
Document.
The
addition
of
verification
relationships
for
the
purposes
of
authentication,
assertion,
key
agreement,
capability
invocation
and
capability
delegation.
The
ability
to
support
relating
multiple
identifiers
with
the
DID
Document,
such
as
the
DID
controller,
also
known
as,
equivalent
IDs,
and
canonical
IDs.
Enhancing
privacy
by
reducing
information
that
could
contain
personally
identifiable
information
in
the
DID
Document.
The
addition
of
a
large
section
on
security
considerations
and
privacy
considerations.
A
Representations
section
that
details
how
the
abstract
data
model
can
be
produced
and
consumed
in
a
variety
of
different
formats
along
with
general
rules
for
all
representations,
producers,
and
consumers.
A
section
detailing
the
DID
Resolution
and
DID
URL
Dereferencing
interface
definition
that
all
DID
resolvers
are
expected
to
expose
as
well
as
inputs
and
outputs
to
those
processes.
DID
Document
examples
in
an
appendix
that
provide
more
complex
examples
of
DID
Document
serializations.
IANA
Considerations
for
multiple
representations
specified
in
DID
Core.
Removal
of
the
Future
Work
section
as
much
of
the
work
has
now
been
accomplished.
An
acknowledgements
section.
D.
Acknowledgements
This
section
is
non-normative.
The
Working
Group
extends
deep
appreciation
and
heartfelt
thanks
to
our
Chairs
Brent
Zundel
and
Dan
Burnett,
as
well
as
our
W3C
Staff
Contact,
Ivan
Herman,
for
their
tireless
work
in
keeping
the
Working
Group
headed
in
a
productive
direction
and
navigating
the
deep
and
dangerous
waters
of
the
standards
process.
The
Working
Group
gratefully
acknowledges
the
work
that
led
to
the
creation
of
this
specification,
and
extends
sincere
appreciation
to
those
individuals
that
worked
on
technologies
and
specifications
that
deeply
influenced
our
work.
In
particular,
this
includes
the
work
of
Phil
Zimmerman,
Jon
Callas,
Lutz
Donnerhacke,
Hal
Finney,
David
Shaw,
and
Rodney
Thayer
on
Pretty
Good
Privacy
(PGP)
in
the
1990s
and
2000s.
In
the
mid-2010s,
preliminary
implementations
of
what
would
become
Decentralized
Identifiers
were
built
in
collaboration
with
Jeremie
Miller's
Telehash
project
and
the
W3C
Web
Payments
Community
Group's
work
led
by
Dave
Longley
and
Manu
Sporny.
Around
a
year
later,
the
XDI.org
Registry
Working
Group
began
exploring
decentralized
technologies
for
replacing
its
existing
identifier
registry.
Some
of
the
first
written
papers
exploring
the
concept
of
Decentralized
Identifiers
can
be
traced
back
to
the
first
several
Rebooting
the
Web
of
Trust
workshops
convened
by
Christopher
Allen.
That
work
led
to
a
key
collaboration
between
Christopher
Allen,
Drummond
Reed,
Les
Chasen,
Manu
Sporny,
and
Anil
John.
Anil
saw
promise
in
the
technology
and
allocated
the
initial
set
of
government
funding
to
explore
the
space.
Without
the
support
of
Anil
John
and
his
guidance
through
the
years,
it
is
unlikely
that
Decentralized
Identifiers
would
be
where
they
are
today.
Further
refinement
at
the
Rebooting
the
Web
of
Trust
workshops
led
to
the
first
implementers
documentation
,
edited
by
Drummond
Reed,
Les
Chasen,
Christopher
Allen,
and
Ryan
Grant.
Contributors
included
Manu
Sporny,
Dave
Longley,
Jason
Law,
Daniel
Hardman,
Markus
Sabadello,
Christian
Lundkvist,
and
Jonathan
Endersby.
This
initial
work
was
then
merged
into
the
W3C
Credentials
Community
Group,
incubated
further,
and
then
transitioned
to
the
W3C
Decentralized
Identifiers
Working
Group
for
global
standardization.
Portions
of
the
work
on
this
specification
have
been
funded
by
the
United
States
Department
of
Homeland
Security's
(US
DHS)
Science
and
Technology
Directorate
under
contracts
HSHQDC-16-R00012-H-SB2016-1-002,
and
HSHQDC-17-C-00019,
as
well
as
the
US
DHS
Silicon
Valley
Innovation
Program
under
contracts
70RSAT20T00000010,
70RSAT20T00000029,
70RSAT20T00000030,
70RSAT20T00000045,
70RSAT20T00000003,
and
70RSAT20T00000033.
The
content
of
this
specification
does
not
necessarily
reflect
the
position
or
the
policy
of
the
U.S.
Government
and
no
official
endorsement
should
be
inferred.
Portions
of
the
work
on
this
specification
have
also
been
funded
by
the
European
Union's
StandICT.eu
program
under
sub-grantee
contract
number
CALL05/19.
The
content
of
this
specification
does
not
necessarily
reflect
the
position
or
the
policy
of
the
European
Union
and
no
official
endorsement
should
be
inferred.
Work
on
this
specification
has
also
been
supported
by
the
Rebooting
the
Web
of
Trust
community
facilitated
by
Christopher
Allen,
Shannon
Appelcline,
Kiara
Robles,
Brian
Weller,
Betty
Dhamers,
Kaliya
Young,
Kim
Hamilton
Duffy,
Manu
Sporny,
Drummond
Reed,
Joe
Andrieu,
and
Heather
Vescent.
Development
of
this
specification
has
also
been
supported
by
the
W3C
Credentials
Community
Group
,
which
has
been
Chaired
by
Kim
Hamilton
Duffy,
Joe
Andrieu,
Christopher
Allen,
Heather
Vescent,
and
Wayne
Chang.
The
participants
in
the
Internet
Identity
Workshop,
facilitated
by
Phil
Windley,
Kaliya
Young,
Doc
Searls,
and
Heidi
Nobantu
Saul,
also
supported
this
work
through
numerous
working
sessions
designed
to
debate,
improve,
and
educate
participants
about
this
specification.
The
Working
Group
thanks
the
following
individuals
for
their
contributions
to
this
specification
(in
alphabetical
order,
Github
handles
start
with
@
and
are
sorted
as
last
names):
Denis
Ah-Kang,
Nacho
Alamillo,
Christopher
Allen,
Joe
Andrieu,
Antonio,
Phil
Archer,
George
Aristy,
Baha,
Juan
Benet,
BigBlueHat,
Dan
Bolser,
Chris
Boscolo,
Pelle
Braendgaard,
Daniel
Buchner,
Daniel
Burnett,
Juan
Caballero,
@cabo,
Tim
Cappalli,
Melvin
Carvalho,
David
Chadwick,
Wayne
Chang,
Sam
Curren,
Hai
Dang,
Tim
Daubenschütz,
Oskar
van
Deventer,
Kim
Hamilton
Duffy,
Arnaud
Durand,
Ken
Ebert,
Veikko
Eeva,
@ewagner70,
Carson
Farmer,
Nikos
Fotiou,
Gabe,
Gayan,
@gimly-jack,
@gjgd,
Ryan
Grant,
Peter
Grassberger,
Adrian
Gropper,
Amy
Guy,
Daniel
Hardman,
Kyle
Den
Hartog,
Philippe
Le
Hegaret,
Ivan
Herman,
Michael
Herman,
Alen
Horvat,
Dave
Huseby,
Marcel
Jackisch,
Mike
Jones,
Andrew
Jones,
Tom
Jones,
jonnycrunch,
Gregg
Kellogg,
Michael
Klein,
@kdenhartog-sybil1,
Paul
Knowles,
@ktobich,
David
I.
Lehn,
Charles
E.
Lehner,
Michael
Lodder,
@mooreT1881,
Dave
Longley,
Tobias
Looker,
Wolf
McNally,
Robert
Mitwicki,
Mircea
Nistor,
Grant
Noble,
Mark
Nottingham,
@oare,
Darrell
O'Donnell,
Vinod
Panicker,
Dirk
Porsche,
Praveen,
Mike
Prorock,
@pukkamustard,
Drummond
Reed,
Julian
Reschke,
Yancy
Ribbens,
Justin
Richer,
Rieks,
@rknobloch,
Mikeal
Rogers,
Evstifeev
Roman,
Troy
Ronda,
Leonard
Rosenthol,
Michael
Ruminer,
Markus
Sabadello,
Cihan
Saglam,
Samu,
Rob
Sanderson,
Wendy
Seltzer,
Mehran
Shakeri,
Jaehoon
(Ace)
Shim,
Samuel
Smith,
James
M
Snell,
SondreB,
Manu
Sporny,
@ssstolk,
Orie
Steele,
Shigeya
Suzuki,
Sammotic
Switchyarn,
@tahpot,
Oliver
Terbu,
Ted
Thibodeau
Jr.,
Joel
Thorstensson,
Tralcan,
Henry
Tsai,
Rod
Vagg,
Mike
Varley,
Kaliya
"Identity
Woman"
Young,
Eric
Welton,
Fuqiao
Xue,
@Yue,
Dmitri
Zagidulin,
@zhanb,
and
Brent
Zundel.
E.
IANA
Considerations
This
section
will
be
submitted
to
the
Internet
Engineering
Steering
Group
(IESG)
for
review,
approval,
and
registration
with
IANA
when
this
specification
becomes
a
W3C
Proposed
Recommendation.
Any
application
that
requires
an
identifier
that
is
decentralized,
persistent,
cryptographically
verifiable,
and
resolvable.
Applications
typically
consist
of
cryptographic
identity
systems,
decentralized
networks
of
devices,
and
websites
that
issue
or
verify
verifiable
credentials.
