Copyright © 2026 World Wide Web Consortium. W3C® liability, trademark and permissive document license rules apply.
Verifiable credentials provide a mechanism to express credentials on the Web in a way that is cryptographically secure, privacy respecting, and machine-verifiable. This specification provides data model and HTTP protocols to issue, verify, present, and manage data used in such an ecosystem.
This document is merely a W3C-internal document. It has no official standing of any kind and does not represent consensus of the W3C Membership.
This specification is highly experimental and changing rapidly. Implementation in non-experimental systems is discouraged unless you are participating in the weekly meetings that coordinate activity around this specification.
Comments regarding this document are welcome. Please file issues directly on GitHub, or send them to public-credentials@w3.org ( subscribe, archives).
This section is non-normative.
The Verifiable Credentials specification [VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0] provides a data model and serialization to express digital credentials in a way that is cryptographically secure, privacy respecting, and machine-verifiable. This specification provides a set of HTTP Application Programming Interfaces (HTTP APIs) and protocols for issuing, verifying, presenting, and managing Verifiable Credentials.
When managing verifiable credentials, there are two general types of APIs that are contemplated. The first type of APIs are designed to be used within a single security domain. The second type of APIs can be used to communicate across different security domains. This specification defines both types of APIs.
The APIs that are designed to be used within a single security domain are used by systems that are operating on behalf of a single role such as an issuer, verifier, or holder. One benefit of these APIs for the Verifiable Credentials ecosystem is that they define a useful, common, and vetted modular architecture for managing Verifiable Credentials. For example, this approach helps software architects integrate with common components and speak a common language when implementing systems that issue verifiable credentials. Knowing that a particular architecture has been vetted is also beneficial for architects that do not specialize in verifiable credentials. Documented architectures and APIs increase market competition and reduce vendor lock-in and switching costs.
The APIs that are designed to operate across multiple security domains are used by systems that are communicating between two different roles in a verifiable credential interaction, such as an API that is used to communicate presentations between a holder and a verifier. In order to achieve protocol interoperability in verifiable credentials interactions, it is vital that these APIs be standardized. The additional benefits of documenting these APIs are the same for documenting the single-security-domain APIs: common, vetted architecture and APIs, increased market competition, and reduced vendor lock-in and switching costs.
This specification contains the following sections that software architects and implementers might find useful:
This section is non-normative.
The Verifiable Credentials API is optimized towards the following design goals:
| Goal | Description |
|---|---|
| Modularity | Implementers need only implement the APIs that are required for their use case enabling modularity between Issuing, Verifying, and Presenting. |
| Simplicity | The number of APIs and optionality are kept to a minimum to ensure that they are easy to implement and audit from a security standpoint. |
| Composability | The APIs are designed to be composable such that complex flows are possible using a small number of simple API primitives. |
| Extensibility | Extensions to API endpoints are expected and catered to in the API design enabling experimentation and the addition of value-added services on top of the base API platform. |
A RESTful API approach was used as a basis for the specification. Some endpoints use what is referred to as the 'controller' resource naming style. JSON Schema: A Media Type for Describing JSON Documents is used to define the acceptable inputs to the APIs.
This section is non-normative.
The Verifiable Credentials Data Model defines three fundamental roles, the issuer, the verifier, and the holder.
Actors fulfilling each of these roles may use a number of software or service components to realize the API for exchanging Verifiable Credentials.
Each role associates with a role-specific Coordinator, Service, and Admin as well as their own dedicated Storage Service. In addition, the issuer may also manage a Status Service for revocable credentials issued by the issuer.
Any given implementation may choose to combine any or all of these components into a single functional application. The boundaries and interfaces between these components are defined in this specification to ensure interoperability and substitutability across the Verifiable Credential conformant ecosystem.
Based on this architectural thinking, we may want to frame this API as a roadmap of related specifications, integrated in an extensible way for maximum substitutability. Several technologies, such as EDVs and WebKMSs would likely benefit from the crypto suite Approach taken for verifiable credential proofs. Defining a generic mechanism that can be realized by any functionally conformant technology enables flexibility while laying the groundwork with current existing functionality. In this way, we may be able to acknowledge that elements like Key Services, Storage, and Status are necessary parts of this API while deferring the definition of how those elements work to specification already in development as well as those yet to be written.
In addition to aggregating components into a single app, implementers may choose to operationalize any given role over any number active instances of deployed software. For example, a browser-based holder coordinator should be considered as an amalgam of a web browser, various code running in that browser, one or more web servers (in the case of cross-origin AJAX or remote embedded content), and the code running on that server. Each of those elements runs as different software packages in different configurations, each executing just part of the overall functionality of the component. For the sake of this API, each component satisfies all of its required functionality as a whole, regardless of deployment architecture.
As well as sections marked as non-normative, all authoring guidelines, diagrams, examples, and notes in this specification are non-normative. Everything else in this specification is normative.
The key words MAY, MUST, MUST NOT, OPTIONAL, RECOMMENDED, REQUIRED, SHOULD, and SHOULD NOT in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
A conforming issuer service implementation MUST provide the interface described in Section 3.2.1 Issue Credential. Other interfaces described in Section 3.2 Issuing MAY also be provided.
A conforming verifier service implementation MUST provide the interface described in Section 3.3.1 Verify Credential and Section 3.3.2 Verify Presentation. Other interfaces described in Section 3.3 Verifying MAY also be provided.
A conforming holder service implementation MUST provide the interface described in Section 3.6.4 Get Exchange Protocols and Section 3.6.5 Participate in an Exchange. Conformance to protocols, query languages, and data formats described in Section 3.7 Initiating Interactions, Section 3.4 Requesting a Presentation, Section 3.5.2 Create Presentation, Section 3.5 Presenting, and Section 3.6 Workflows and Exchanges MAY also be provided.
A conforming status service implementation MUST provide the interface described in Section 3.1.7.3 Update Status.
A conforming workflow service implementation MUST provide all interfaces Section 3.6 Workflows and Exchanges.
A conforming service client implementation MUST provide the means to communicate with all REQUIRED interfaces provided by the corresponding service implementation. That is, a status client implementation provides means to communicate with all mandatory interfaces exposed by a status service implementation.
All implementations MAY provide functionality beyond this specification.
This section is non-normative.
Terminology used throughout this document is defined in the Terminology section of the Verifiable Credentials Data Model v2.0 specification.
A coordinator executes the business rules and policies set by the associated role. Often this is a custom or proprietary coordinator developed specifically for a single party acting in that role; it is the integration glue that connects the controlling party to the verifiable credential ecosystem.
Coordinators might provide a visual user interface, depending on the implementation. Pure command-line or continuously running services might also be able to realize this component.
With the exception of the status service, all role-to-role communication is between coordinators acting on behalf of its particular actor to fulfill its role.
An issuer coordinator executes the rules about who gets what credentials, including how the parties creating or receiving those credentials are authenticated and authorized. Typically the issuer coordinator integrates the issuer's back-end system with the issuer service. This integration uses whatever technologies are appropriate; the interfaces between the issuer coordinator and back-end services are out of scope for this specification. The issuer coordinator drives the issuer service.
A verifier coordinator communicates with a verifier service to first check authenticity and timeliness of a given verifiable credential or verifiable presentation, then applies the verifier's business rules before ultimately accepting or rejecting that verifiable credential or verifiable presentation. Such business rules might include evaluating the issuer of a particular claim or simply checking a configured allow-list. The verifier coordinator exposes an API for submitting verifiable credentials to the verifier per the verifier's policies. For example, the verifier coordinator might only accept verifiable credentials from current users of the verifier's other services. These rules typically require bespoke integration with the verifier's existing back-end.
A holder coordinator executes the business rules for approving the flow of credentials under the control of the holder, from issuers to verifiers. In some deployments this means exposing a user interface that gives individual holders a visual way to authorize or approve verifiable credential storage or transfer. Some functionality of the holder coordinator is commonly referred to as a digital wallet. In this API, the holder coordinator initiates all flows. They request verifiable credentials from issuers. They decide if, and when, to share those verifiable credentials with verifiers. Within this API, there is no way for either the issuer or the verifier to initiate the transfer of a verifiable credential. In many scenarios, the holder coordinator is expected to be under the control of an individual human, ensuring a person is directly involved in the communication of verifiable credentials, even if only at the step of authorizing the transfer. However, some verifiable credentials are about organizations, not individuals. How individuals using holder coordinators related to organizations, and in particular, how organizational credentials are securely shared with, and presented by, (legal) agents of those organizations is not in scope for this specification.
A service provides lower-level API functionality, driven by its associated coordinator, and is designed to enable infrastructure providers to offer verifiable credential capability through service delivery architectures such as Software-as-a-Service. All services expose HTTP endpoints to their authorized coordinators, which are themselves operating on behalf of an associated role. Although deployed services might provide their own HTML interfaces, such interfaces are out of scope for this specification. Only the HTTP endpoints of services are defined herein.
An issuer service takes requests to issue verifiable credentials from authorized issuer coordinators and return conforming verifiable credentials. This service has access to cryptographic material, such as private keys or key services which utilize private keys, in order to create the proofs for verifiable credentials. The API between the issuer service and its associated cryptographic key management service is out of scope for this specification.
A verifier service takes requests to verify verifiable credentials and verifiable presentations and returns the result of checking their proofs and status (if present). The service only checks the authenticity and timeliness of the verifiable credential, leaving the verifier coordinator to finish applying any necessary business rules.
A holder service takes requests to create Verifiable Presentations from an optional set of verifiable credentials and returns well-formed, signed Verifiable Presentations containing those VCs. These verifiable presentations are used with issuers to demonstrate control over DIDs prior to verifiable credential issuance and with verifiers to present specific VCs.
A status service provides a privacy-preserving means of publishing and checking the status of any Verifiable Credentials issued by the issuer. Implementers of verifier services are encouraged to understand the privacy implications of checking status by referring to the respective status specification used by the verifiable credential. For specific mechanisms by which to manage verifiable credential statuses, it's recommended to refer to well-known external specifications, such as the [VC-BITSTRING-STATUS-LIST].
A storage service is used by each actor in the system to store their own verifiable credentials and corresponding data, as needed. Several known implementations use secure data storage such as encrypted data vaults for storing the holder's verifiable credentials and use cryptographic authorizations to grant access to those verifiable credentials to verifier coordinators, as directed by the holder. In-browser retrieval of such stored credentials can enable web-based verifier coordinators to integrate data from the holder without sharing that data with the verifier—the data is only ever present in the browser. Authorizing third-party remote access to holder storage is likely in-scope for this API, although we expect this to be defined using extensible mechanisms to support a variety of storage and authorization approaches.
The issuer and verifier storage solutions may or may not use secure data storage. Since all such storage interaction is moderated by the bespoke issuer and Storage Coordinators, any necessary integrations can simply be part of that bespoke customization. We expect different implementations to compete on the ease of integration into various back-end storage platforms.
A workflow service provides a way for coordinators to automate specific interactions for specific users. Each role (holder, issuer, and verifier) can run their own workflow service to create and manage exchanges that realize particular workflows. Administrators configure the workflow system to support particular flows. Then, when the business rules justify it, coordinators create exchanges at their workflow service and give access to those exchanges to any authorized party.
An administration service is an acknowledgement that each of the other components need a way to be configured and managed, without prescribing the interfaces or means of that configuration. Some components might use JSON files to drive a command line interface. Others might expose HTML pages. It is expected that different implementations will compete on the power, ease, and flexibility of their administration and therefore, configuration is largely out of scope for this specification. There are some places where some configuration mechanisms are provided, such as in Section 3.6.1 Create Workflow, where there was broad agreement to standardize some configuration parameters. As the market matures, other areas of configuration standardization might occur in future versions of this specification.
The APIs defined in this specification presume that they are attached to a specific instance with an associated configuration that has been put in place by a system administrator. When a client calls an endpoint on a particular instance, the instance uses the configuration and options provided by the client to execute the action.
For example, the /credentials/issue endpoint can be provided at the end of a
longer URL such as /instances/12345/credentials/issue. In this case, it is the
instance that is configured to know which cryptographic key to use for
issuance, whether or not a status list is involved, the type of credential to
issue, the credential format, and what additional options are possible on the
endpoint.
Software clients that call a particular instance might not have the capability to configure an instance, or be aware of the setup that the administrator did on the instance other than the requisite details to make appropriate use of it. Administration endpoints for configuring instances could be provided by implementations but are not necessarily exposed as HTTP APIs; configuration can also be done through configuration files or graphical interfaces.
A coordinator instance can have access to multiple service instances in order to support different use cases or a use case with complex flows. Runtime discovery of service instance configuration is not defined by this specification as services are expected to be known by the coordinator at the time of deployment.
Each coordinator or service instance is associated with a specific configuration that drives its behavior. This section contains how some of those configurations might be performed.
There are no restrictions put on the base URL for any particular instance.
The URL paths used throughout this specification are shown as absolute paths and
their base URL MAY be the host name of the server (e.g.,
website.example), a subdomain (e.g., api.website.example, or
a path within that domain (e.g., website.example/api).
This API can be deployed in a variety of networking environments which might contain hostile actors. As a result, conforming service implementations require conforming service client implementations to utilize secure authorization technologies when performing certain types of requests. Each HTTP endpoint defined in this document specifies whether or not authorization is required when performing a request. With the exception of the class of forbidden authorization protocols discussed later in this section, this API is agnostic regarding authorization mechanism.
This API is meant to be generic and useful in many scenarios that require the issuance, possession, presentation, and/or verification of Verifiable Credentials. To this end, implementers are advised to consider the following classifications of use cases:
The rest of this section gives examples of the authorization technologies that have been contemplated for use by conforming implementations. Other equivalent authorization technologies can be used. Implementers are cautioned against using non-standard or legacy authorization technologies.
Requests to this API MUST NOT utilize any authorization protocol that includes long-lived static credentials such as usernames and passwords or similar values in those requests. An example of such a forbidden protocol is HTTP Basic Authentication [RFC7617].
If the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework [RFC6749] is utilized for authorization, the access tokens utilized by clients MAY be OAuth 2.0 Bearer Tokens [RFC6750] or any other valid OAuth 2.0 token type. Any valid OAuth 2.0 grant type MAY be used to request the access tokens. However, OAuth 2.0 MUST be implemented in the following way:
OAuth2 tokens for this purpose have an audience of the particular issuer
instance, e.g., origin/issuers/zc612332f3.
The scopes are generalized to read/write actions on particular endpoints, as follows:
read:/ would allow reading on any API on a particular instance.
write:/ would allow writing on any API on a particular instance.
write:/credentials/issue would only allow writing to that particular API.
Other authorization mechanisms that support delegation might be defined in the future.
Some of the endpoints defined in the following sections accept an options
object. All properties of the options object are OPTIONAL when configuring
each instance, as these properties are intended to meet per-deployment needs
that might vary. Thus, any given instance configuration MAY prohibit client use
of some options properties in order to prevent clients from passing certain
data to that instance. Likewise, an instance configuration MAY require that
clients include some options properties.
Implementations MAY extend an options object with additional properties.
As extension properties are implementation specific, they ought not be mandatory. This is to maintain interoperability by avoiding clients needing to be modified to use a specific implementation.
When adding an extension options property, consider whether providing
optionality to clients is necessary. If not, using instance configuration to
vary API functionality might be a preferable approach.
Implementations MUST throw an error if an endpoint receives data, options, or option values that it does not understand or know how to process.
All entity bodies in requests and responses sent to or received from the API
endpoints defined by this specification MUST be serialized as JSON and include
the Content-Type header with a media type value of application/json.
Implementers are encouraged to pay attention to the payload sizes of the Verifiable Credentials that their implementations process.
Presentations can bundle a large volume of credentials, which can result in a higher request size than anticipated by implementers. This raises the risk of interoperability issues.
A default maximum size of 10MB per verifiable credential is RECOMMENDED as an interoperability baseline, with the possibility of configuring a larger size if required. This also accommodates the 16MB size limit of most document-based database storage solutions.
By default, large binary values are expected to be linked to and a hash included (unless there is a privacy reason for not doing so).
This section contains the HTTP API endpoint definitions and implementation guidance that is to be followed when creating conforming implementations.
This section gives an overview of all endpoints in the VC-API by the component the endpoint is expected be callable from. If a component does not have a listing below it means the VC-API does not currently specify any endpoints for that component.
Below are all endpoints expected to be exposed by the issuer coordinator, along with the component that is expected to call the endpoint.
Below are all endpoints expected to be exposed by the issuer service, along with the component that is expected to call the endpoint.
Below are all endpoints expected to be exposed by the verifier coordinator, along with the component that is expected to call the endpoint.
Below are all endpoints expected to be exposed by the verifier service, along with the component that is expected to call the endpoint.
Below are all endpoints expected to be exposed by the holder coordinator, along with the component that is expected to call the endpoint.
Below are all endpoints expected to be exposed by the holder service, along with the component that is expected to call the endpoint.
Below are all endpoints expected to be exposed by the status service, along with the component that is expected to call the endpoint.
The status service provides three primary operations for managing status lists:
The status list operations described in this specification (create list, get list, and set status) are non-normative and represent a recommended implementation approach. Status list creation and management might depend on various factors not accounted for in this specification, such as the following:
Implementers are free to design their status list management systems according to their specific needs, as long as the resulting status information can be verified according to the status mechanism specification in use (e.g., [VC-BITSTRING-STATUS-LIST]).
To maximize privacy, verifiers are encouraged to obtain status information from holders rather than directly querying the status service. When a holder presents a verifiable credential, they are encouraged to include the corresponding status list credential or sufficient status information to enable verification without requiring the verifier to contact the issuer. This approach prevents correlation of status checks with specific verifiers or verifiable credentials.
This endpoint is used to create a new status list credential that can be used to track the status of verifiable credentials. A status list is itself a verifiable credential that contains status information for multiple credentials, enabling privacy-preserving status checks. The status list credential is returned in the response and can be made publicly accessible for verification purposes.
For consistency in verification processes, the status list credential typically uses the same securing mechanism (proof type and cryptographic suite) as the verifiable credentials it will be linked to. This allows verifiers to verify both the credentials and their associated status lists using the same verification methods.
For specific mechanisms by which to manage verifiable credential statuses, implementers are encouraged to refer to well-known external specifications, such as the [VC-BITSTRING-STATUS-LIST] specification, which provides a normative example of how to implement status list credentials.
This endpoint retrieves a publicly accessible status list credential. This endpoint is typically publicly accessible without authentication to enable verifiers and holders to retrieve status information.
The endpoint returns the status list credential in an appropriate format
based on the media type requested or the default format configured for the
service. The response is typically either a VerifiableCredential or an
EnvelopedVerifiableCredential, consistent with the format used by the
verifiable credentials that reference this status list. This allows
verifiers to process the status list using the same mechanisms they use for
verifying the associated credentials.
For privacy-preserving status mechanisms, verifiers are encouraged to obtain status
information from holders rather than directly querying this endpoint. When a
holder presents a verifiable credential that includes status information
(such as a credentialStatus property), the holder is encouraged to also provide the
corresponding status list credential or sufficient status information to enable
verification. This approach prevents the issuer from correlating status
checks with specific verifiers or verifiable credentials, thereby
preserving privacy.
When a verifier needs to check the status of a verifiable credential, the recommended flow is as follows:
This endpoint might also be useful for holders who need to retrieve status list credentials to include in presentations, or for cases where direct issuer contact is acceptable from a privacy perspective.
This endpoint is used to update the status of an issued verifiable credential within a status list. When a credential's status needs to be changed (e.g., revoked or suspended), this endpoint updates the corresponding entry in the status list credential.
The request typically specifies the credential to update, the status list entry information (including the status list credential identifier and the index within that list), and the new status value. The status service updates the status list credential accordingly.
Below are all endpoints expected to be exposed by the Workflow Service, along with the component that is expected to call the endpoint.
The following APIs are defined for issuing a Verifiable Credential:
This endpoint is used to issue a verifiable credential.
To issue credentials with a media type other than application/vc — such as
application/mdoc, application/vc+sd-jwt,
application/vcb;barcode-format=qr_code, or
application/vcb;barcode-format=pdf417 — an EnvelopedVerifiableCredential
can be returned in the response.
If a use case requires an issuer instance to attach multiple proofs to the
provided credential, the instance MUST attach all of these proofs in response
to a single call to the /credentials/issue endpoint.
If a provided credential already contains one or more proofs, the behavior is
determined by the configuration of the issuer instance. An issuing instance
SHOULD be configured to handle existing proofs in one of the following ways:
previousProof property to establish the chain relationship.
credential
values that contain existing proof values are provided, when
the instance is configured to only accept credentials without existing proofs.
The specific approach used depends on the configuration of the issuer instance and the intended use case for the verifiable credential.
An issuer service or a holder service might store an issued verifiable credential for an extended period of time. When this is done, it can be useful to delete such a verifiable credential; for instance, an issuer might need to do so because of regulatory requirements such as the right to be forgotten. See Section B.3 Deletion for additional considerations related to the removal of verifiable credentials from systems.
The following APIs are defined for verifying a Verifiable Credential:
This endpoint is used to verify a verifiable credential.
To verify credentials with a media type other than application/vc, such as
application/mdoc, application/vc+sd-jwt,
application/vcb;barcode-format=qr_code, or
application/vcb;barcode-format=pdf417 — an EnvelopedVerifiableCredential
can be provided in the request.
This endpoint is used to verify a verifiable presentation and, by default, all verifiable credentials contained within it.
The verification process includes:
Business rule validation (such as verifying that credential subjects match the presentation holder, or authorization policies about who can present which credentials) is outside the scope of this verification endpoint and should be performed by the calling application.
The instance should create a challenge for use during verification, and track
the number of times the challenge has been passed to verification endpoints as
options.challenge.
When working with verifiable credentials, and decentralized identifier-based authentication, one party often needs to request data from another. This section describes the general format of those requests and provides a concrete verifiable presentation request format as well.
A verifiable presentation request is a request a verifier makes to a holder for a presentation. To make a request for one or more credentials wrapped in a verifiable presentation, a verifier constructs a JSON request describing one or more credentials that it wishes to receive from the holder. The general format for a request looks like the following:
{
// one or more requests for verifiable credentials
"query": [{
"type": "QueryByExample",
// query details specific to QueryByExample...
}],
// The target security domain, such as a website domain, to include in
// the verifiable presentation
"domain": "domain.example",
// The random challenge string to include in the verifiable presentation
"challenge": "f63cb0d2-760e-11f0-a2b1-67febb854a5f"
}
The query property serves as the main extension point mechanism for requests
for data in the presentation. While this document defines a common query
mechanism (see Section 3.4.2 Query By Example), all query objects are of the
following form:
type property with an associated string value.
The "query by example" credential query format is designed to enable developers to easily request the claims that they need from one or more verifiable credentials, to enable a particular business process. The query can also specify other information, such as one or more issuers that are trusted by the verifier.
{
"query": [{
"type": "QueryByExample",
"credentialQuery": [{
// (Optional) Reason for requesting this credential that
// may be shown to a user by their software
"reason": "We need to know if you are an alumni of this school.",
// (Mandatory) An example of the credential being requested
"example": {
"@context": [
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
],
"type": "ExampleAlumniCredential",
// (Optional) Select credential based on credential subject type
"credentialSubject": {
"type": "Alumni"
}
},
// (Optional) Specify credentials from a particular authority or
// delegate of the authority
"authority": [{
"issuer": "did:web:authority.example"
}]
}]
}],
"challenge": "3182bdea-63d9-11ea-b6de-3b7c1404d57f",
"domain": "reunion.example"
}
This section defines how a verifier can request that a holder perform Decentralized Identifier-based Authentication [DID-CORE]. In its simplest form, the authentication protocol is comprised of a challenge by the verifier and a response by a holder:
{
"query": [{
"type": "DIDAuthentication",
"acceptedMethods": [{"method": "example"}]
}],
"challenge": "99612b24-63d9-11ea-b99f-4f66f3e4f81a",
"domain": "example.com"
}
The DID Authentication request above specifies that the verifier would like the holder to demonstrate control over a DID by generating a digital signature over the provided challenge. The holder might respond by providing the following response:
{
"@context": ["https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2"],
"type": "VerifiablePresentation",
"holder": "did:example:12345",
"proof": {
"type": "DataIntegrityProof",
"cryptosuite": "eddsa-rdfc-2022",
"verificationMethod": "did:example:12345#key-1",
"challenge": "99612b24-63d9-11ea-b99f-4f66f3e4f81a",
"domain": "example.com",
"created": "2024-02-25T14:58:42Z",
"proofPurpose": "authentication",
"proofValue": "z3FXQjecWufY46...UAUL5n2Brbx"
}
}
The DID Authentication examples shown in this document use a new proof type
called DataIntegrityProof which is currently under development in the
W3C Verifiable Credentials Working
Group.
The DID Authentication query format enables a verifier to request that a holder authenticate in specific ways. A DID Authentication query MUST be of the following form:
| Property | Description |
|---|---|
| type |
A REQUIRED string value that MUST be set to DIDAuthentication.
|
| acceptedMethods |
An optional array of objects expressing that the verifier would accept
any DID Method listed. Each object in the array MUST contain a property called
method with a value that is a DID Method name, and MAY contain other
properties that are specific to the DID Method. Valid example values
include:
|
| acceptedCryptosuites |
An optional array of objects that conveys the cryptography suites among which
the holder MUST choose when generating a cryptographic proof to be
submitted to this verifier. Each object in the
array MUST contain a property called cryptosuite with a value that is a
cryptosuite name, and MAY contain other properties that are specific to the
cryptosuite. Valid example values include:
|
The following example demonstrates that the verifier would like the holder to use the DID Web method and a data integrity ECDSA cryptography suite to authenticate over the established communication channel, such as the Credential Handler API (CHAPI):
{
"query": [{
"type": "DIDAuthentication",
"acceptedMethods": [{"method": "key"}],
"acceptedCryptosuites": [{"cryptosuite": "ecdsa-rdfc-2019"}]
}],
"challenge": "99612b24-63d9-11ea-b99f-4f66f3e4f81a",
"domain": "example.com"
}
In the next example, the verifier would like the holder to use either the DID Key or DID Web method, with the standard EdDSA data integrity cryptography suite; optionally include a cryptographic proof that they are capable of performing a data integrity BBS proof; and authenticate over a different communication channel, in this case using a Verifiable Credential API HTTP endpoint.
{
"query": [{
"type": "DIDAuthentication",
"acceptedMethods": [{"method": "key"}, {"method": "web"}],
"acceptedCryptosuites": [{"cryptosuite": "ecdsa-rdfc-2019"}]
}, {
"type": "DIDAuthentication",
"required": false,
"acceptedMethods": [{"method": "key"}, {"method": "web"}],
"acceptedCryptosuites": [{"cryptosuite": "bbs-2023"}]
}],
"challenge": "zLEwtBYgQVNR4tyeo",
"domain": "didauth.example"
}
The DID Authentication response format enables a holder to provide the information requested by the verifier. A DID Authentication response MUST be a verifiable presentation of the following form:
| Property | Description |
|---|---|
| type |
A REQUIRED string value that MUST be set to VerifiablePresentation.
|
| holder | A REQUIRED string value that MUST be set to a specific DID that is of the type that was requested in the DID Authentication query. |
| proof |
A REQUIRED value that MUST be one or more specific digital proof types that
were requested in the DID Authentication query. Each proof object MUST
include the domain and challenge values that were provided in the DID
Authentication query. Holder implementations MUST ensure that the domain specified
by the verifier matches the domain used for the current channel of
communication.
|
It is vital that a holder implementation check the domain provided by
the verifier against the domain used for the current channel of communication.
If a holder fails to do so, a dishonest verifier could then replay the
message to a domain that is not their own. For example, a dishonest verifier
operating from the evil.example domain could retrieve a challenge from your
bank, specify a domain value of yourbank.example, and then replay your
response to your bank to get access to your financial accounts. This attack is
mitigated as long as implementations ensure that the appropriate domain is used
when generating the verifiable presentation.
The example below demonstrates a simple DID Authentication response.
{
"@context": ["https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2"],
"type": "VerifiablePresentation",
"holder": "did:example:12345",
"proof": {
"type": "DataIntegrityProof",
"cryptosuite": "eddsa-rdfc-2022",
"verificationMethod": "did:example:12345#key-1",
"challenge": "99612b24-63d9-11ea-b99f-4f66f3e4f81a",
"domain": "example.com",
"created": "2024-02-25T14:58:42Z",
"proofPurpose": "authentication",
"proofValue": "z3FXQjecWufY46...UAUL5n2Brbx"
}
}
In Verifiable Presentation Requests, the structuring and retrieval of information rely on the use of logical operations. "AND" and "OR" operations play crucial roles in defining the path to desired data.
At the top-most level of the request structure, different types of queries are
expected to be processed as "AND" operations if each one's group property
is set to the same value.
In this example, there are two queries with the group flag set to
certification. This results in an "AND" operation, indicating that both of
these conditions need to be met in order to fulfill the request.
{
"query": [{
"type": "QueryByExample",
"group": "certification",
// query details ...
},
// "AND"
{
"type": "DigitalCredentialQueryLanguage",
"group": "certification",
// query details ...
}]
}
Within a specific query type, an "OR" operation can be applied, by either not
specifying the group or providing group values that are different from
one another.
{
"query": [{
"type": "QueryByExample",
"group": "college-degree",
// query details ...
},
// "OR"
{
"type": "DigitalCredentialQueryLanguage",
"group": "job-experience",
// query details ...
}]
}
The following APIs are defined for presenting a Verifiable Credential:
The URL path value exchange-id is
meaningful to the server but is opaque to the client. While some server
implementations might use values that happen to be human-readable, clients are
strongly advised to not assign semantics to any human-readable values.
An EnvelopedVerifiablePresentation can be returned in the response
in order to create presentations with a media type other than application/vp,
such as application/vp+jwt.
Discovery is an optional call for the holder coordinator to ensure the holder coordinator can support the exchange protocol requirements before calling the endpoint. Coordinators SHOULD support the exchange discovery endpoint.
A workflow defines a particular set of steps for exchanging verifiable credentials between two parties across a trust boundary. Each step can involve the issuance, verification, transmission, and/or presentation of verifiable credentials. Workflows are designed to support both linear sequences of steps and more complex patterns including branching logic and repeated steps, enabling sophisticated interactions between the parties involved. Examples of VC API workflows include, but are not limited to, the following:
Workflow instances are expected to be created by administrators, for use with,
for example, coordinator websites. A workflow instance is created by
performing an HTTP POST to the workflow service's /workflows endpoint. The
HTTP request body includes the configuration for the workflow instance. This
includes, but is not limited to, information about the steps that define the
workflow and any credential templates that will be used to issue verifiable
credentials. The steps that define the workflow might also be templates,
enabling additional flexibility. If a workflow involves the issuance of
verifiable credentials, or the verification of presentations or credentials,
then the workflow instance configuration can include authorization capabilities
to use one or more issuer and/or verification services.
Once a workflow instance exists, authorization to create and query particular workflow interactions, called exchanges, can be given to coordinators.
An exchange represents a particular interaction based on a given workflow. The interaction will take place between an exchange client and the workflow service. Exchanges are expected to be transitory, only existing as long as the interaction takes to complete. The workflow service stores state information about each exchange, such as whether the exchange is pending, active, or complete, as well as the current step in the workflow, any workflow-specific variables and data, and any verifiable presentations and credentials received while the exchange executes. Implementers are free to use whatever variables they desire for their implementation in addition to the reserved variables defined in Section 3.6.3 Create Exchange. While there is no technical limitation on the number of steps in a workflow, implementers might want to enforce a default maximum number of steps to prevent bugs.
An issuer, verifier, or holder coordinator is responsible for creating
exchanges. The coordinator creates an exchange by performing an HTTP POST to
the /exchanges subpath of a chosen workflow, on the workflow service. The
HTTP request body includes an expiration date and time for the exchange and any
variables to be used to populate the workflow's templates for the particular
exchange. The request body can also include configuration options to enable the
exchange to be executed using additional protocols beyond this API. Once the
exchange is created, an exchange URL that identifies the exchange and enables
interaction with it is returned to the coordinator.
The exchange URL is given to the exchange client so that it can initiate the exchange. Note that while the exchange URL is given to the coordinator to then provide it to the exchange client, the actual exchange is performed between the exchange client and the workflow service; the coordinator is not involved after providing the exchange URL to the exchange client. To be clear: a coordinator can still use its own exchange client for any use case that requires it to execute the exchange itself.
Initiating the exchange does not require any authorization beyond the exchange URL. Depending on the workflow service implementation, exchange URLs can also be capability URLs (i.e., the URL is an unguessable secret such that only whomever is given the URL can initiate the exchange). If the workflow that the exchange is based on requires any additional authorization beyond the possession of the exchange URL, this is to be obtained during the exchange, not at its initiation.
The exchange URL can also be used by the coordinator to query the current state of the exchange as it progresses and to obtain information associated with the exchange that the workflow service has stored. Querying the exchange in this way requires additional authorization that the coordinator is expected to have and that the exchange client is not.
How the exchange URL is transmitted from a coordinator to an exchange client is out of scope for this specification. Known mechanisms for sharing the exchange URL with the client include the Credential Handler API (aka CHAPI), a QR code, or a universal link.
Exchanges are designed to be executable using other protocols in addition to this API exchange protocol; for example, an exchange could potentially be executable with any of the OID4VCI, OID4VP, DIDComm, and exchange protocols. The protocols supported depend on the complexity of the workflow the exchange is based on, and the options provided by the coordinator when the exchange was created.
The exchange client is expected to initiate the exchange using a protocol that is compatible with how the client received the exchange URL. For example, the exchange URL could have been provided over CHAPI with a protocol identifier indicating that this API protocol ought to be used. Alternatively, the exchange URL could be included as the "credential_issuer" in an OID4VCI credential offer, or as the "client_id" of an OID4VP authorization request, indicating that OID4VCI or OID4VP, respectively, ought to be used. This section focuses on how an exchange client uses this API to interact with the exchange; see Appendix TBD to see how to combine exchanges with other protocols such as OID4VCI, OID4VP, and DIDComm.
Exchanges that are executed using this API protocol involve messages sent as request and response bodies over HTTP. Each message consists of a simple JSON object that includes zero or more of the following properties and values:
redirectUrl: A URL that can be used to continue an interaction at another
location. One use case for this is to send the user of an exchange client
back to a coordinator website after an exchange has completed.
verifiablePresentation: A Verifiable Presentation. This is used by either
party in an exchange to provide information to the other party, either because
the latter requested it or because the former is simply offering it.
verifiablePresentationRequest: A Verifiable Presentation Request. This is
used by either party in an exchange to request information from the other
party.
Custom properties and values might also be included, but are expected to trigger errors in implementations that do not recognize them.
To initiate an exchange using this API protocol, an exchange client
performs an HTTP POST sending a JSON object as the request body. In the
simplest case, when the client has no constraints of its own on the exchange
— i.e., it has nothing to request from the other party — the
JSON object is empty ({}). The workflow service responds with its own JSON
object in the response body.
If that response object is empty, the exchange is complete and nothing is
requested from nor offered to the exchange client. If the object includes
verifiablePresentationRequest, then the exchange is not yet complete and
some additional information is requested, as specified by the contents of the
associated verifiable presentation request. If the object includes
verifiablePresentation, then some information is offered, such as
verifiable credentials issued to the holder operating the exchange client or
verifiable credentials with information about the exchange server's operator
based on the exchange client's request. If the object includes redirectUrl,
the exchange is complete and the workflow service recommends that the client
proceed to another place to continue the interaction in another form.
Many verifiable credential use cases can be implemented using these basic
primitives. Either party to an exchange is capable of requesting verifiable
presentations and of providing one or more verifiable credentials that might
be necessary to establish trust and/or gain authorization capabilities, and
either party is capable of presenting credentials that they hold or that they
have issued. Specific workflows can be configured to expect specific
presentations and credentials and to reject deviations from the expected flow
of information. When a workflow service determines that a particular message
is not acceptable, it raises an error by responding with a 4xx HTTP status
message and a JSON object that expresses information about the error.
The exchange design approach is layered: it aims to provide a minimal communication message layer and a set of primitives that enable most use cases to be implemented via specific verifiable presentation requests and verifiable credentials at a layer above. See the appendices that follow for examples of workflows and exchanges that use specific verifiable presentation requests and verifiable credentials.
These examples will be added later.A given interaction with an exchange is expected to be short-lived but other mechanisms can be used to enable longer or multi-stage interactions. Examples of other interaction mechanisms include SMS, email, web notifications, or phone calls. This approach simplifies digital wallet implementation and allows existing mechanisms to be reused without reinvention within this API. The Web or native platforms are expected to enable additional interactions via applications (such as Web browsers) or other platform features. For example, in asynchronous issuance, a holder requests a credential but waits for processing. In such cases, system components (such as an issuer coordinator) make use of mechanisms outside this API to notify the holder when their credential is ready for collection.
The following APIs are defined for using workflows and exchanges for credential use cases that require crossing trust boundaries:
In the workflows and exchanges APIs, a "local" ID refers to an ID that is local
to a service instance. In other words, an exchangeId or workflowId refers to
a fully qualified URL, while a localExchangeId or localWorkflowId refers to
a specific element in the URL path.
Workflows can contain information about steps, credential templates,
and authorization. In some cases, a workflow will also reference the
reserved results variable at different points in its configuration
(typically in credential templates). This variable holds data that
the workflow service receives from clients throughout the course
of an exchange. Here is a basic workflow configuration that contains
a DID Authentication step and a credential delivery step:
{
"id": "9fd3bc6d-4a04-4b3d-a983-3482d0586626",
"initialStep": "didAuthRequest",
"steps": {
"didAuthRequest": {
"createChallenge": true,
"verifiablePresentationRequest": {
"query": {
"type": "DIDAuthentication",
"acceptedMethods": [
{
"method": "key"
},
{
"method": "web"
}
],
"acceptedCryptosuites": [
{
"cryptosuite": "eddsa-rdfc-2022"
},
{
"cryptosuite": "ed25519-2020"
}
]
},
"domain": "https://issuer.example.com"
},
"nextStep": "credentialDelivery"
},
"credentialDelivery": {
"issueRequests": [
{
"credentialTemplateId": "caffb919-053a-4bfa-beba-80567904f842",
"variables": "sampleAchievementCredential"
}
]
}
},
"credentialTemplates": [
{
"id": "caffb919-053a-4bfa-beba-80567904f842",
"type": "jsonata",
"template": "{
\"credential\": {
\"@context\": [
\"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2\",
\"https://purl.imsglobal.org/spec/ob/v3p0/context-3.0.3.json\",
\"https://purl.imsglobal.org/spec/ob/v3p0/extensions.json\"
],
\"id\": sampleAchievementCredential.id,
\"type\": [\"VerifiableCredential\", \"AchievementCredential\"],
\"issuer\": {
\"type\": [\"Profile\"],
\"name\": \"Example Issuer\",
\"image\": {
\"type\": \"Image\",
\"id\": \"https://issuer.example.com/logo.png\"
}
},
\"awardedDate\": sampleAchievementCredential.awardedDate,
\"validFrom\": sampleAchievementCredential.validFrom,
\"name\": \"Sample Achievement\",
\"credentialSubject\": {
\"id\": results.didAuthRequest.verifiablePresentation.holder,
\"type\": \"AchievementSubject\",
\"name\": sampleAchievementCredential.credentialSubject.name,
\"achievement\": {
\"id\": sampleAchievementCredential.credentialSubject.achievement.id,
\"type\": [\"Achievement\"],
\"achievementType\": sampleAchievementCredential.credentialSubject.achievement.achievementType,
\"name\": sampleAchievementCredential.credentialSubject.achievement.name,
\"description\": sampleAchievementCredential.credentialSubject.achievement.description,
\"alignment\": sampleAchievementCredential.credentialSubject.achievement.alignment
}
}
}
}"
}
],
"controller": "did:web:issuer.example.com"
}
Some workflows will need to reference custom variables in one or more
of their steps. In this case, the coordinator will need
to provide the appropriate value(s) for the variable(s) when it
creates an exchange. Here is an example of a workflow configuration
with a templated DID Authentication step
(Notice the verifiablePresentationRequest and callbackUrl variables
referenced in the didAuthRequest step):
{
"id": "9fd3bc6d-4a04-4b3d-a983-3482d0586626",
"initialStep": "didAuthRequest",
"steps": {
"didAuthRequest": {
"stepTemplate": {
"type": "jsonata",
"template": "{
"createChallenge": true,
"verifiablePresentationRequest": verifiablePresentationRequest,
"callback": {
"url": callbackUrl
},
"nextStep": "credentialDelivery"
}"
}
},
"credentialDelivery": {
"issueRequests": [
{
"credentialTemplateId": "caffb919-053a-4bfa-beba-80567904f842",
"variables": "sampleAchievementCredential"
}
]
}
},
"credentialTemplates": [
{
"id": "caffb919-053a-4bfa-beba-80567904f842",
"type": "jsonata",
"template": "{
\"credential\": {
\"@context\": [
\"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2\",
\"https://purl.imsglobal.org/spec/ob/v3p0/context-3.0.3.json\",
\"https://purl.imsglobal.org/spec/ob/v3p0/extensions.json\"
],
\"id\": sampleAchievementCredential.id,
\"type\": [\"VerifiableCredential\", \"AchievementCredential\"],
\"issuer\": {
\"type\": [\"Profile\"],
\"name\": \"Example Issuer\",
\"image\": {
\"type\": \"Image\",
\"id\": \"https://issuer.example.com/logo.png\"
}
},
\"awardedDate\": sampleAchievementCredential.awardedDate,
\"validFrom\": sampleAchievementCredential.validFrom,
\"name\": \"Sample Achievement\",
\"credentialSubject\": {
\"id\": results.didAuthRequest.verifiablePresentation.holder,
\"type\": \"AchievementSubject\",
\"name\": sampleAchievementCredential.credentialSubject.name,
\"achievement\": {
\"id\": sampleAchievementCredential.credentialSubject.achievement.id,
\"type\": [\"Achievement\"],
\"achievementType\": sampleAchievementCredential.credentialSubject.achievement.achievementType,
\"name\": sampleAchievementCredential.credentialSubject.achievement.name,
\"description\": sampleAchievementCredential.credentialSubject.achievement.description,
\"alignment\": sampleAchievementCredential.credentialSubject.achievement.alignment
}
}
}
}"
}
],
"controller": "did:web:issuer.example.com"
}
For the openId options, specifically the values
createAuthorizationRequest and authorizationRequest, the example below is
provided to help developers understand what an OID4VP Authorization Request
looks like:
{
"response_type": "vp_token",
"presentation_definition": {
"id": "f1bd224a-0fed-469a-b64a-dad7cf63fd98",
"input_descriptors": [
{
"id": "77d50c71-95ef-442c-a372-f32e17634fab",
"constraints": {
"fields": [
{
"path": [
"$['@context']"
],
"filter": {
"type": "array",
"contains": {
"type": "string",
"const": "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2"
}
}
},
{
"path": [
"$['type']"
],
"filter": {
"type": "array",
"contains": {
"type": "string",
"const": "VerifiableCredential"
}
}
},
{
"path": [
"$['credentialSubject']['name']"
],
"filter": {
"type": "string"
}
}
]
},
"purpose": "We require a name credential to display your name when you post messages."
}
]
},
"response_mode": "direct_post",
"client_metadata": {
"vp_formats_supported": {
"ldp_vc": {
"proof_type_values": [
"DataIntegrityProof",
"Ed25519Signature2020"
],
"cryptosuite_values": [
"ecdsa-rdfc-2019",
"eddsa-rdfc-2022"
]
}
},
"vp_formats": {
"jwt_vp": {
"alg": [
"EdDSA",
"Ed25519",
"ES256",
"ES384"
]
},
"jwt_vp_json": {
"alg": [
"EdDSA",
"Ed25519",
"ES256",
"ES384"
]
},
"di_vp": {
"proof_type": [
"ecdsa-rdfc-2019",
"eddsa-rdfc-2022",
"Ed25519Signature2020"
]
},
"ldp_vp": {
"proof_type": [
"ecdsa-rdfc-2019",
"eddsa-rdfc-2022",
"Ed25519Signature2020"
]
}
}
},
"client_id": "https://some.example/workflows/z1A7ojitBF3pGpVzW17MgU7zm/exchanges/z1ACKwiBiXmuGjpKAdKMpBZXB/openid/client/authorization/response",
"client_id_scheme": "redirect_uri",
"response_uri": "https://some.example/workflows/z1A7ojitBF3pGpVzW17MgU7zm/exchanges/z1ACKwiBiXmuGjpKAdKMpBZXB/openid/client/authorization/response",
"nonce": "z1ACKwiBiXmuGjpKAdKMpBZXB"
}
There is an expires property associated with exchanges, denoting the
expiration date and time of the exchange. It is created using the
/workflows/{localWorkflowId}/exchanges endpoint. This impacts the lifetime of
challenges associated with such an exchange: if a challenge is bound to an
exchange, that challenge ceases to be valid at the date referenced by the
expires property of the exchange.
This endpoint provides a mechanism for a client to query an exchange for all of the protocols that it supports. A single exchange can support many protocols that are capable of achieving the goals of the exchange, such as the issuance of a verifiable credential into a digital wallet.
This endpoint also enables the website operator to delegate the authority to
execute the exchange to a third party, such as a service provider, by delegating
that trust through the HTTPS domain. For example, the website brand.example
can delegate the operation of the exchange to a partner saas.example by using
the saas.example domain in the list of protocols.
This enables the client to depend on their trust in brand.example to delegate
the operation of the exchange to a third party in the same way that a website
links to resources from other domains to render a web page.
The APIs in this specification enables unmediated (automated, machine-to-machine) or mediated (person in the loop) exchanges to be executed. These exchanges are initiated by a holder coordinator and responded to by any Coordinator that implements exchanges. The flows consist of the following steps:
The holder coordinator MAY call the Coordinator's exchange discovery endpoint to determine if the holder coordinator supports the Coordinator's protocol requirements on a particular endpoint, before actually initiating the exchange.
A diagram of the steps outlined above is presented below:
The general exchange above can be performed in a way that is fully automated, mediated by a person, or in a hybrid fashion where portions are automated but interaction by a person is required at certain stages. The second step above is used to provide guidance on whether the next step is automated or requires an individual to intervene.
It is useful for an implementation to communicate how to start interacting with it to another implementation. This bootstrapping process is called initiating an interaction, and communicates what protocols each implementation supports as well as how to start a particular interaction with the implementation.
While several interaction specifications reside in this document, the general approach is agnostic as to use case, application, and protocol. This approach can be used to pair two or more applications that desire to bootstrap into a particular protocol over any transmission medium — such as a web browser, QR Code (optical medium), or NFC (wireless medium) — where the protocol does not need to involve this API.
The sequence diagram below outlines an issuer generating an interaction
URL, using a QR Code to share it with a holder, and proceeding with the
vcapi protocol:
The sequence diagram below outlines a verifier generating an interaction
URL, using a QR Code to share it with a holder, and proceeding with the
vcapi protocol:
The sequence diagram below outlines a holder generating an interaction URL,
using a QR Code to share it with a verifier, and proceeding with the
inviteRequest protocol:
The format of the interaction URL MUST conform to the syntax for the
URL Standard and contain an iuv query parameter encoding the interaction URL
version number, which MUST be 1 when using this version of this API. The
interaction URL SHOULD be an HTTPS URL that contains an interaction-specific
identifier. The URL SHOULD be opaque and require no URL syntax processing before
it is fetched by the receiving system. An example of such a URL is shown below:
https://app.example/interactions/z8n38Dp7a?iuv=1
Protocols that encode lengthy protocol-specific information into URLs suffer from limitations placed by software libraries on the maximum allowable length of a URL. At the time of writing, the suggested URL length limit is roughly 2,000 characters. Implementers SHOULD NOT put information that can be expressed in the response to a GET request for an interaction URL, defined in Section 3.7.3 Interaction Protocols Response, into the query parameters of the interaction URL.
A coordinator has the freedom to put the interaction URL at any location on its Web origin, because
it is expected to be considered opaque by consuming software (except for the iuv query parameter).
However, it is important that the interaction URL be hosted on a coordinator and NOT hosted at the
workflow service. This enables the coordinator's Web origin (DNS domain name) to be used as a consistent trust signal by
consumers and the application of business rules that might modulate actions.
An interaction QR Code MUST be an interaction URL expressed as a QR code according to ISO18004:2024: QR Code Bar Code Symbology Specification. To ensure broad interoperability, the length of the interaction URL SHOULD be as short as possible, SHOULD NOT exceed 400 alphanumeric characters, and MUST NOT exceed 4,296 alphanumeric characters. An example of an interaction QR code can be found below:
https://app.example/interactions/z8n38Dp7a?iuv=1
Performing a retrieval of the interaction URL results in instructions on how to start an interaction with the remote system.
When the interaction URL is fetched using an Accept header of
application/json, a single JSON object containing a protocols map MUST
be returned where each key is a protocol identifier and each
value is a URL that can be used to initiate the interaction. For
example, performing an HTTP GET on the
https://app.example/interactions/z8n38Dp7a?iuv=1 interaction URL might
result in either of the following responses:
{
"protocols": {
"inviteRequest": "https://saas.example/workflows/123/exchanges/987/invite-request/response",
"vcapi": "https://saas.example/workflows/123/exchanges/987",
"OID4VP": "openid4vp://?client_id=https%3A%2F%2Fapp.example%2Fworkflows%2F123%2Fexchanges%2F987%2Fopenid%2Fclient%2Fauthorization%2Fresponse&request_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fapp.example%2Fworkflows%2F123%2Fexchanges%2F987%2Fopenid%2Fclient%2Fauthorization%2Frequest'"
}
}
{
"protocols": {
"inviteRequest": "https://saas.example/interactions/123/invite-request/response"
}
}
The protocol response enables protocol execution to be delegated to third-party
service providers through the HTTPS domain trust model, similar to the
delegation mechanism described in the Get
Exchange Protocols section. For example, the website app.example can
delegate the operation of the exchange to a partner saas.example by including
the saas.example domain in the list of protocols.
When the interaction URL is fetched using any unrecognized Accept header,
a text/html document MUST be returned with directions instructing a human
being to use specific software that understands how to process interaction URLs.
Some coordinator implementations will implement the protocols endpoint as a pass
through to a protocols endpoint for an exchange instance. For example, a GET on
https://app.example/interactions/z8n38Dp7a?iuv=1 will result in a pass-through
GET on https://app.example/workflows/123/exchanges/987/protocols, which would
return the response above. Implementing interaction URLs in this way can
provide an easier implementation path.
The inviteRequest interaction protocol is used by a local system to signal to
the remote system that it would like an invitation to a remote system via a
specific URL, such as a website where an individual can engage in a use-case
specific interaction. If the inviteRequest interaction protocol is selected,
the local system sends data using an HTTP POST to instruct the remote system
where to send the individual. A couple examples of the POST data are shown below.
These examples intend to highlight that this specification does not state any
requirements as to how the "url" field is formatted, but does recommend that an
implementer of this interaction mechanism make use of a unique ID:
{
"url": "https://website.example/checkout/8372974",
"purpose": "Checkout at ShopCo",
"referenceId": "417bcaf2-14d9-11f0-99d7-9f094678517b"
}
{
"url": "https://website.example/forms/7864165",
"purpose": "Fill out online form",
"referenceId": "d4a6e5b8-1715-4654-8e47-e68b311756d1"
}
The vcapi interaction protocol is used to initiate a specific exchange
as described in Section 3.6.5 Participate in an Exchange.
{
"verifiablePresentationRequest": {
"query": [{
"type": "QueryByExample",
"credentialQuery": [{
"reason": "Please provide your student ID.",
"example": {
"@context": [
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2",
],
"type": "StudentIdCredential",
"credentialSubject": {
"studentId": ""
},
},
"trustedIssuer": [{
"issuer": "did:web:university.example"
}]
}]
}],
"challenge": "5e34826e-14da-11f0-98a5-8b1c0a196728",
"domain": "university.example"
}
}
When an implementation detects an anomaly while processing a document, a ProblemDetails object can be used to report the issue to other software systems. The interfaces for these objects follow [RFC9457] to encode the data. A ProblemDetails map consists of the following properties:
type key MUST be present and its value MUST be a URL
identifying the type of problem.
title key SHOULD provide a short but specific human-readable
string for the problem.
detail key SHOULD provide a longer human-readable string for the
problem.
Leveraging keys such as detail, and instance is encouraged, to
provide more contextual feedback about the error, while being conscious of
security concerns and hence not disclosing sensitive information.
The following problem description types are defined by this specification:
Further lists of ProblemDetails that might be reported by implementations can be found in the following specifications:
{
"type": "https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model#CRYPTOGRAPHIC_SECURITY_ERROR",
"status": 400,
"title": "CRYPTOGRAPHIC_SECURITY_ERROR",
"detail": "The cryptographic security mechanism couldn't be verified. This is likely due to a malformed proof or an invalid verificationMethod."
}
The example type URLs above will work in the future after VCDM v2.0 becomes a
global standard. To ensure the error links to the appropriate location, you can
replace the base URL of https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model with
www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model-2.0 for the time being.
Implementers are strongly advised to sanitize all server errors in production environments, as not doing so can lead to information disclosure.
It is recommended to avoid raising errors while performing verification, and instead gather ProblemDetails objects to include in the verification results.
This specification defines a distinction between a verification error and a
verification warning. Errors are ProblemDetails relating to cryptography,
data model, and malformed context and are unrecoverable. Warnings are
ProblemDetails relating to status and validity periods and might be
recoverable or leave the subsequent action to the discretion of the
application.
If an error is included, the verified property of the VerificationResponse
object MUST be set to false; if no errors are included, it MUST be set to
true.
{
"verified": false,
"document": verifiableCredential,
"mediaType": "application/vc",
"controller": issuer,
"controllerDocument": didDocument,
"warnings": [ProblemDetails],
"errors": [ProblemDetails]
}
Verifiable credentials [VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0] are a standard data model designed to mitigate risks of misuse and fraud. As a data model, verifiable credentials are protocol-neutral and consider at least two types of entities: issuer and subject. When the subject of a verifiable credential is a natural person or linked to a natural person, privacy and human rights can be impacted by the vastly more efficient processing of standardized verifiable credentials as compared to their analog ancestors.
Technology, in the form of standardized APIs and protocols for issuing verifiable credentials, further enhances the efficiency of processing verifiable credentials and adds to the risks of unforeseen privacy and human rights consequences.
Verifiable credentials issuance has a request phase and a delivery phase. The request might be made by the subject or another role, and delivery can be to a client that might or might not be controlled by the subject. Delegation is highly relevant for both phases. The issuer might delegate processing of the request to a separate entity. The subject, for their part, might also delegate the ability to request a verifiable credential to a separate entity. Note that the subject might not always have the capability or ability to perform delegation. Examples include a new born baby, a pet, and a person with dementia. So the request might be performed by a third party who was not delegated by the subject. The ability to delegate is a third dimension in the enhanced efficiency of processing verifiable credentials and has impact on privacy and human rights.
The architecture described in this specification is designed for market acceptance through a combination of efficiency and respect for privacy and human rights. APIs and protocols for processing verifiable credentials do not favor delegation by the issuer role over delegation by the subject role.
It is considered a bad privacy practice for a verifier to contact an issuer about a specific verifiable credential. This practice is known as "phoning home" and can result in a mismatch in privacy expectations between holders, issuers, verifiers, and other parties expressed in a verifiable credential. Phoning home enables issuers to correlate unsuspecting parties with the use of certain verifiable credentials which can violate privacy expectations that each entity might have regarding the use of those credentials. For example, what is expected by the holder to be a private interaction between them and the verifier becomes one where the issuer is notified of the interaction.
There are some interactions where contacting the issuer in a privacy-preserving manner upholds the privacy expectations of the holder. For example, contacting the issuer to get revocation status information in a privacy-respecting manner, such as through a status list that provides group privacy can be acceptable as long as the issuer is not able to single out which verifiable credential is being queried based on the retrieval of the status list. For more information on one such mechanism see the Bitstring Status List v1.0 specification.
Verifiers are urged to not "phone home" in ways that will create privacy violations. When retrieving content that is linked from a verifiable credential, using mechanisms such as Oblivious HTTP and aggressively caching results can improve the privacy characteristics of the ecosystem.
Holder coordinator implementations, such as digital wallet software, can receive and store verifiable credentials that include proofs that are not understood by the software, however, these proofs are not to be presented by the implementation. A verifiable credential with several proofs, some of which the implementation understands and others that it does not, can be presented by the implementation provided that the proof of choice is understood by the implementation and the others are removed prior to presentation. Implementations maintain allow lists of understood proofs and ensure that any proofs not present are stripped prior to presentation.
Implementations can use the presence of unknown proofs as potential adoption signals in a decentralized ecosystem. It is also important for implementers to understand that in the three party model, the holder coordinator acts as a conduit between the issuer and the verifier, enabling interoperability between the two even if/when the holder coordinator doesn't necessarily implement verification of certain proofs. As an example in another space: "Web browsers were able to download and store PDF files prior to adding their own PDF-reader functionality" — this kind of decentralized innovation, interoperability, and progressive enhancement is important in the three party model and more generally in scalable, decentralized ecosystems. It is also important to help reduce centralization by not forcing people to adopt specific new and different software just to store a verifiable credential that has at least one proof on it that their current software does not (yet) understand.
A holder coordinator might be able to present some proofs even when it does not have the software to verify them,
but this needs to be understood with certainty, not guessed. That is,
when adding a copy of a stored verifiable credential to a presentation,
holder software needs to remove any proofs
that it does not explicitly know it can safely present. Any
proofs that software does explicitly know it can
safely present can remain. For example, a digital wallet that can verify
an ecdsa-rdfc-2019
proof, but not an ecdsa-jcs-2019 proof, can still present either. Other proofs,
such as those that offer selective disclosure and / or unlinkable disclosure features require
transformation (that is, a
base proof is transformed to a derived proof plus a "reveal document") and,
therefore, a wallet will not be able to present these proofs unless the wallet has implemented the procedures for
deriving a proof. It is vital that a wallet not present a base proof by
accident, as it might include information that is secret to the holder.
This specification strongly suggests the use of HTTPS for interaction URLs for the following reasons:
Using protocol schemes that are not rooted in the HTTPS trust model requires separate encryption protocol, key management, and trust models to be used, which are often less broadly developed and deployed and require much more development and analysis to determine the threat and privacy model.
The APIs provided by this specification enable the deletion of verifiable credentials and verifiable presentations from storage services. The result of these deletions and the side-effects they might cause are out of scope for this specification. However, implementers are advised to understand the various ways deletion can be implemented. There are at least two types of deletion that are contemplated by this specification.
Partial deletion marks a record for deletion but continues to store some or all of the original information. This mode of operation can be useful if there are audit requirements for all credentials and/or presentations over a particular time period, or if recovering an original credential might be a useful feature to provide.
Complete deletion purges all information related to a given verifiable credential or verifiable presentation in a way that is unrecoverable. This mode of operation can be useful when removing information that is outdated and beyond the needs of any audit or when responding to any sort of "right to be forgotten" request.
When deleting a verifiable credential, handling of its status information needs to be considered. Some use cases might call for deletion of a particular verifiable credential to also set the revocation and suspension bits of that verifiable credential, such that any sort of status check for the deleted credential fails and use of the credential is halted.
Given the scenarios above, implementers are advised to allow the system actions that occur after a delete to be configurable, such that system flexibility is sufficient to address any verifiable credential use case.
Larger transactions can trigger DoS incidents. It's recommended to configure the payload size accepted by endpoints at an instance level.
In most cases, simply verifying the proof might not be sufficient to properly handle the received data. Verifier services are expected to configure additional validation steps based on their use cases. To define such additional validations, implementers can refer to specifications such as Section 2.3: Resource Integrity and Section 2.4: Contexts and Vocabularies in the Verifiable Credential Data Integrity 1.0 specification where further information can be found about context handling and integrity verification.
Improper validation will often lead to security vulnerabilities.
Additional validation steps can be accounted for when returning a verification response object, through the problem details.
Implementers are urged to use industry standard secure coding practices when implementing this specification. Even deeply experienced software developers can make mistakes and the use of secure coding checklists and vulnerability scanning software can catch errors that would result in security compromises. Following checklists and guides such as the OWASP Secure Coding Practices Checklist and the OWASP Web Security Testing Guide can help reduce the chance of insecure implementations.
Since the interfaces to manage the lifecycle of verifiable credentials described by this specification are generalized in nature, the security implications of their use might not be immediately apparent to readers. To understand the sort of security concerns one might need to consider in a complete software system, implementers are urged to read about how this technology can be used by the Verifiable Credentials Data Model v2.0 specification (specifically the section on Verifiable Credential Security Considerations), as well as the Verifiable Credential Data Integrity 1.0 specification (specifically the section on Data Integrity Security Considerations).
The lifecycle of a verifiable credential includes the creation of a workflow, an initial interaction to engage in an exchange, issuance, status management, local credential administration, presentation, verification, and validation. This specification defines an HTTP-based API for verifiable credential lifecycle management that can be used by issuers, holders, and verifiers. There are other specifications, such as the Digital Credential API, OpenID for Verifiable Credential Issuance v1.0, and OpenID for Verifiable Presentations v1.0 that might seem to provide similar functionality to this specification. This section explains what other specifications have been considered before the standardization of this specification, and how this specification differs from other specifications in the ecosystem.
Fundamentally, this specification is the only specification that is focused on the entire lifecycle management of verifiable credentials. It is agnostic to credential format, credential query language, and credential delivery protocol. Any credential format that is expressible as a verifiable credential or an enveloped verifiable credential can be used with this specification. Similarly, credential delivery protocols such as OpenID for Verifiable Credential Issuance v1.0 or OpenID for Verifiable Presentations v1.0 can be used in interactions and exchanges defined by this specification. Finally, this specification supports multiple credential query languages to provide for flexibility as technologies improve and market verticals specialize.
This specification defines APIs for the entirety of verifiable credential lifecycle management because not doing so creates opportunities for vendor lock-in. No other specification exists that provides interfaces that prevent vendor lock throughout the lifecycle management of verifiable credentials.
The Working Group thanks the following individuals for their contributions to this specification: The final list of acknowledgements will be compiled at the end of the Candidate Recommendation phase.
Portions of the work on this specification have been funded by the United States Department of Homeland Security's Silicon Valley Innovation Program under contracts 70RSAT20T00000003, 70RSAT20T00000010, 70RSAT20T00000029, 70RSAT20T00000031, 70RSAT20T00000033, and 70RSAT20T00000043. The content of this specification does not necessarily reflect the position or the policy of the U.S. Government and no official endorsement should be inferred.
Development of this specification has also been supported by the W3C Credentials Community Group, chaired by Kim Hamilton Duffy, Heather Vescent, and Wayne Chang.
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